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Kathryn Hendley*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia
earned a reputation for being a chaotic environment for business. Some
commentators went so far as to label it as the "Wild East," a scar? place
where law was largely irrelevant and criminal gangs held sway. This
image of the Russian business climate during the 1990s was generated
primarily by journalistic accounts, which tended to highlight the activities
of those who had figured out how to profit from privatization.2 Though
undeniably fascinating, these so-called oligarchs were not the norm.
Arguably, an understanding of how garden-variety firms coped with the
uncertainty wrought by the transition away from state socialism is more
revealing of the true nature of the post-Soviet economy and the role of law
in it. In a series of articles, I have begun to fill this gap in the literature by
exploring the day-to-day reality of life for industrial enterprises in Yeltsin's
* William Voss-Bascom Professor of Law and Political Science, University of Wisconsin-
Madison. Funding for the field work that underlies the analysis was provided by grants from
the National Science Foundation and the National Council for Eurasian and East European
Research. Support during the writing of the article was provided by the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars. Thanks are due to Molly Berkery for research assistance.
' See e.g., Seymour M. Hersh, The Wild East, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 1994, at 61-86;
Viktor M. Sergeev, THE WILD EAST: CRIME AND LAWLESSNESS IN POST-COMMUNIST RUSSIA
(1998); THE WILD EAST: NEGOTIATING THE RUSSIAN FINANCIAL FRONTIER (Peter Westin Ed.,
2001).
2 See e.g., STEPHEN HANDELMAN, COMRADE CRIMINAL: RUSSIA'S NEW MAFIYA (1997);
DAVID SATIER, DARKNESS AT DAWN: THE RISE OF THE RUSSIAN CRIMINAL STATE (2004);
DAVID HOFFMAN, THE OLIGARCHS: WEALTH AND POWER IN THE NEW RUSSIA (2003); ROSE
BRADY, KAPITALIZM: RUSSIA'S STRUGGLE TO FREE ITS ECONOMY (2000).
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Russia.3 The picture that emerges is more nuanced than the stereotype of
industry beholden to the mafia that the popular media has perpetuated.
In this article, I turn my attention to the role of contracts. Both the
scholarly literature and the popular media downplayed the relevance of
contracts in Russia during the 1990s, arguing that weaknesses in the
substantive law and the judicial system rendered contracts virtually
unenforceable.4 Indeed, in a 1994 speech at the Kellstadt Graduate School
of Business at DePaul University, the then-Chairman of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, said that "[t]here is no
law of contracts" in Russia.' The very fact that such a claim, which is
preposterous on its face, could be made by someone of Greenspan's stature
illustrates the almost hysterical attitude that prevailed toward the Russian
business environment. The reality was far less sensational. While the laws
on the books in Russia governing contracts were far from ideal (much like
the flawed contract law in other countries), they provided an adequate
framework for doing business. Likewise, the economic (or arbitrazh)
courts that handled contractual disputes between firms had their problems
but were capable of resolving contractual dispute and enforcing their
decisions. But Greenspan's implication that the post-Soviet Russian
economy was deeply dysfunctional was accurate. How could it have been
otherwise? In the 1990s, Russia was in the midst of an unprecedented shift
away from state socialism toward some form of market capitalism. The
3 See e.g., Kathryn Hendley, The Role of In-House Counsel in Post-Soviet Russia in the
Wake offPrivatization, 17 INT'L J. OF THE LEGAL PROF No.1 (2010) [hereinafter "Hendley, In-
House Counsel"]; Kathryn Hendley, Beyond the Tip of the Iceberg: Business Disputes in
Russia, in ASSESSING THE VALUE OF LAW IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES, 20-55 (Peter Murrell
ed., 2001); Kathryn Hendley, How Russian Enterprises Cope With Payments Problems, 15
POST-SOVIET AFFAIRS 201 (1999).
4 See Hersh, supra note 1; See also Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing
Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1911, 1924-29 (1996).
Alan S. Greenspan, Thoughts About the Transitioning Market Economies of Eastern
Europe and the Former Soviet Union, 6 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 1, 8 (1994). Greenspan was not
alone in making claims about the lack of substantive law in Russia in the 1990s. See e.g.,
Louis Uchitelle, The Art of a Russian Deal: Ad-Libbing Contract Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17,
1992, at Al.
6 On the arbitrazh courts, see generally Katharina Pistor, Supply and Demand for
Contract Enforcement in Russia: Courts, Arbitration, and Private Enforcement, 22 REV. OF
CENT. & E. EUR. L. 55 (1996); Kathryn Hendley, Remaking an Institution: The Transition in
Russia from State Arbitrazh to Arbitrazh Courts, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 93 (1998). On the
question of enforcing decisions of arbitrazh courts, compare Jonathon R. Hay & Andrei
Shleifer, Private Enforcement of Public Laws: A Theory of Legal Reform, 88 AM. ECON.
REv. 398 (1998) (contending that slowness, corruption, and inability to enforce judgments
makes the arbitrazh courts unappealing) with Kathryn Hendley, Enforcing Judgments in
Russian Economic Courts, 20 POST-SOVIET AFF. 46 (2004) (documenting through an
empirical investigation of 100 non-payments that creditors were able to enforce judgments in
about two-thirds of the cases).
7 See generally ANDERS ASLUND, How RUSSIA BECAME A MARKET ECONOMY (1995).
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transition process was undeniably messy and painful for most Russians. A
lack of confidence in the state's commitment to protecting property rights
may have contributed to this dysfunction. More important, however, were
the weakness of reputational sanctions for contractual breaches and the lack
of reliable information about the creditworthiness of potential trading
partners.
How did Russian industrial firms cope in this environment of profound
uncertainty? To what extent did they use written contracts? Did their use
of contracts necessarily translate into reliance on them when customers
reneged? I began to explore these questions as part of my collaboration on
a 1997 survey of 328 industrial firms fielded in six regions of Russia.9 The
survey was aimed at understanding how business was being conducted in
the transition context.10 We surveyed four key officials at each firm: the
general director, and the heads of the sales, procurement, and legal
departments. Among the most surprising findings was that almost all
(85%) of the surveyed firms relied heavily on contracts." For the most
part, standard form contracts developed by sellers served as the basis for
these agreements. The survey allowed us to capture these firms' behavior at
a particular moment in time, but did not permit an in-depth investigation
into how contracts were being used.
To learn more, I carried out a series of six case studies, selected from
among those that had participated in our 1997 survey.12  The sample
variation of the survey in terms of the size, age, ownership, access to legal
expertise, and industrial sector was replicated to the maximum extent
possible given the challenge of gaining access. The case studies were
8 In the years following the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia suffered economic
setbacks worse than those experienced by the United States in the Great Depression.
Between 1989 and 1994, industrial production decreased by an astounding 50%. See
Michael S. Lelyveld, Russia's Collapse Worst of Century, J. COMM., Nov. 14, 1996, at IA.
For a sense of how it impacted daily industrial life, see David Hoffman, The Russian
Economy's Big Black Hole, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 1996, at Al.
9 The survey was conducted in Barnaul, Ekaterinburg, Moscow, Novosibirsk, Saratov,
and Voronezh.
10 For background on the survey and a summary of results, see Kathryn Hendley, Peter
Murrell & Randi Ryterman, Law, Relationships, and Private Enforcement: Transactional
Strategies ofRussian Enterprises, 52 EUR-ASIA STUD. 627 (2000).
" This statistic was generated from a series of questions in which we asked respondent
firms to provide information about a recent transaction in order to assess the use of contracts.
See Kathryn Hendley, Peter Murrell & Randi Ryterman, Do Repeat Players Behave
Diferently in Russia? Contractual and Litigation Behavior of Russian Enterprises, 33 LAW
& Soc'Y REv. 833, 837 (1999).
12 In the course of that survey, we asked the general directors whether they might be
amenable to having a foreign scholar carry out a case study at their enterprise. Only those
enterprises that indicated some willingness were approached. This excluded 25% (eighty-
three firms) of our sample. For details on the composition of the sample and other
information about the survey, see Hendley et al., supra note 10.
13 Dr. Alla V. Mozgovaya of the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of
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evenly divided between Ekaterinburg, Moscow, and Saratov. The case
study approach is well-suited to research aimed at understanding an
ongoing process. By talking to those involved in the contracting process
and reviewing the files during the several weeks I spent at each firm, I have
been able to bring the somewhat blurred snapshots obtained through the
survey into sharper focus. The sustained contact allowed me to dig deeper
than is possible in research that is based on single interviews.14 The case
studies provide a fascinating glimpse into how Russian managers coped
when faced with profound uncertainty. Among the six case studies, three
different patterns emerged. The analysis not only provides a missing piece
of the story of the transition, but also is instructive to the larger community
of developing countries, many of which face the same pressures today as
Russia was experiencing in the late 1990s.
The timing of the case studies was fortuitous in that enterprise
management had had more than five years to adjust to the end of state
planning and that it was just before the global financial crisis of the summer
of 1998, which hit Russia hard. The research captures an important
moment in time. Presented as archetypes, the case studies reflect general
patterns of behavior. At the same time, the case study method has
limitations. Though providing a window into the behavior of enterprise
managers and underlying motivations, the extent to which these behavioral
patterns are representative is unclear. To the extent possible, I have made
use of the survey data to provide a broader context. The case studies are
also limited by time, but they uncover deeply-seated attitudes. What has
happened in the time since my case studies remains for future investigation.
II. THE ROLE OF TRUST IN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
Before turning to the case studies, it is worth reflecting on when
contracts are useful. In Russia, as elsewhere, written contracts are rarely
Sciences in Moscow, who had coordinated the 1997 survey, negotiated initial access for me.
I then had to convince management to let me stay. Dr. Mozgovaya found that many
enterprises were nervous about the presence of a foreigner. Thanks to the earlier survey, I
began each case study with a wealth of basic information about the enterprise. This greatly
expedited my research, as compared with my earlier case studies. See e.g., Michael
Burawoy & Kathryn Hendley, Between Perestroika and Privatisation: Divided Strategies
and Political Crisis in a Soviet Enterprise, 44 SOVIET STUD. 371 (1992); Kathryn Hendley,
Struggling to Survive: A Case Study of Adjustment at a Russian Enterprise, 50 EUR-ASIA
STUD. 91 (1998).
14 In my own work at Russian industrial firms, I found that in the first meeting
respondents often puffed up their role and the extent of extra-legal activity of the firm. As
my presence became more routine, the real story gradually emerged. This is not to minimize
the contribution of those who have had to rely on more limited contact, but only to suggest
that some of the wilder claims made by respondents ought to be taken with a grain of salt.
See e.g., ALENA LEDENEVA, How RUSSIA REALLY WORKS: THE INFORMAL PRACTICES THAT
SHAPED POST-SOVIET POLITICS AND BUSINESS (2006); VADIM VOLKOV, VIOLENT
ENTREPRENEURS: THE USE OF FORCE IN THE MAKING OF RUSSIAN CAPITALISM (2002).
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mandatory. This is especially true for the sorts of simple transactions-
buying raw materials and other inputs and selling outputs-that dominate
the business lives of the case study firms. The statutory law in most
countries contains default rules that govern a transaction in the absence of a
written agreement to the contrary. In Russia, these terms are set forth in the
Civil Code.15 In a decisive break with the Soviet past, the Civil Code grants
almost complete freedom to the parties to set the parameters of their
agreements. This includes the choice as to whether to rely on the Code's
default rules or to set out their own agreement in writing.17 The decision to
utilize a written contract is not predetermined, but is an affirmative strategic
decision. Likewise, having a written contract does not necessarily translate
into reliance upon it by either or both of the signatories to the contract.
Studying the use of, and reliance upon, written contracts provides insight
into the relationships of the case study enterprises with their trading
partners and, more generally, their confidence in the legal system.
The ability of the relationship between trading partners to shape the
contracting process is well accepted. Stewart Macaulay's "preliminary
study" 8 provides a foundation for much of the empirical and theoretical
work that has followed. 9 He argued that contracts fade in importance when
the parties have confidence in one another.20 Written contracts may still
nominally govern the transaction, but in reality, they mostly gather dust in a
15 Civil Code of the Russian Federation [hereinafter "Civil Code"] arts. 420-53 (Peter B.
Maggs & Alexei N. Zhiltsov eds., 2003). Part I of the Civil Code, which includes the
provisions governing contractual relations, was adopted in November 1994 and so was in
effect at the time of the case studies. Grazhdanskii kodeks RF (chast' pervaia). Sobranie
zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, [Civil Code (part 1), Collection of Legislation of the
Russian Federation] no. 32, item 3301, 1994.
16 Civil Code art. 421.
1 Though oral contracts are permitted under Russian law, they are rare in the Russian
context because the insistence on documentary evidence of contractual obligations in the
procedural rules makes them almost impossible to enforce in court. Civil Code art. 159.
Arbitrazhnyi Protsessual'nyi Kodeks [95 APK] [Code of Arbitration Procedure] art. 60
(Russ. 1995). Vestnik Vysshego Arbitrazhnogo Suda [Bulletin of the Higher Arbitrazh
Court], 1995, No. 6 [monthly], at 25-79. This procedural code was subsequently revised in
2002, but this feature of the code remained unchanged. Because my research focuses on the
situation in Russia in the late 1990s, the 1995 APK is the relevant statute. For an overview
of the changes wrought by the 2002 law, see Kathryn Hendley, Reforming the Procedural
Rules for Business Litigation in Russia: To What End?, 11 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA 363
(Summer 2003).
18 See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study,
28 Am. Soc. REv. 55 (1963).
19 Both the literatures on relational contracting, see e.g., Ian R. Macneil, Contracts:
Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and
Relational Contract Law, 7 Nw. U. L. REv. 854 (1978), and on institutional economics, see
e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange,
73 AM. EcON. REv. 519 (1983), owe an enormous debt to Macaulay's original insights.
20 See Macaulay, supra note 18.
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file cabinet.21 They regain their importance when one of the parties fails to
live up to the expectations of the other. Even then, the first response is
rarely to consult the fine print of the contract, but rather to figure out how to
repair the damage to the relationship.22 The wronged party will pursue his
remedies under the contract only when convinced that the relationship is
irreparably broken.23
This confidence-or trust-that binds trading partners together can
stem from a variety of sources. Though a full discussion of how trust
transpires is beyond the scope of this article, the basis of the trust arguably
influences contracting behavior and, therefore, deserves a few words.
Williamson's distinction between personal and calculative trust is a good
starting point.2 4 Both types of trust provide a foundation for doing business
without much attention to legal niceties (including written contracts). The
differences in how they arise and take shape contribute to divergent
responses when difficulties occur. Personal trust grows out of human
interactions. 25 Typically this involves sustained contact between two firms
through which managers gain confidence in one another and come to rely
more on their counterpart's assurances than on the terms of the written
contract. It can also arise when a preexisting friendship between managers
at two firms is used to ignite a mutually beneficial trading partnership.
Contracts, whether written or implied by law, are beside the point. If the
problems arise, the parties prefer to use non-confrontational methods to find
some middle ground that will allow the relationship to continue.
By contrast, calculative trust is grounded in a rational actor model that
26
assumes all concerned are working to maximize their own interests. As
the label implies, it is not based on friendship but on need. For this reason,
Williamson rails against labeling it as trust, preferring to see it as a
21 Id. at 59.
22 Id. at 61.
23 Id. at 63-64.
24 See Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization, 36 J.L.
& ECON. 453 (1993). For a useful overview of the voluminous literature on trust, see
generally Christel Lane, Introduction: Theories and Issues in the Study of Trust, in TRUST
WITHIN AND BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONS: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES AND EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS
1-30 (Christel Lane & Reinhard Bachmann eds., 1998).
25 On personal trust, Williamson writes, "[s]uch relations are clearly very special ...
trust, if it obtains at all, is reserved for very special relations between family, friends, and
lovers. Such trust is also the stuff of which tragedy is made. It goes to the very essence of
the human condition." Williamson, supra note 24, at 484.
26 Id. at 463. For a critique of Williamson's concept of calculative trust, see Lawrence E.
Mitchell, The Importance of Being Trusted, 81 B.U. L. REv. 591, 603-09 (2001). See also
Lane, supra note 24, at 5; and Simon Deakin & Frank Wilkinson, Contract Law and the
Economics of Interorganizational Trust, in TRUST WITHIN AND BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONS:
CONCEPTUAL ISSUES AND EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS 146-72, 148 (Christel Lane & Reinhard
Bachmann eds., 1998).
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pragmatic assessment of risk.27 It ensues when two businesses are mutually
dependent. The extent to which the two sides are equally matched in their
need or, perhaps more accurately, their desperation for one another varies.
Parity is the exception rather than the rule, which inevitably gives one side
the upper hand in setting the terms of trade. At the core of calculative trust
is suspicion. As a result, the parties tend to put more stock in the written
contract and are likely to be quicker to resort to legal remedies when they
run into problems. This, of course, assumes that the transaction takes place
in an institutional environment where courts can be counted on to protect
property rights.28 There is no bright line between these two types of trust.
A relationship that starts out as a rational calculation of self-interest can,
over time, metamorphose into a friendship. Change in the other direction is
also possible, typically occurring coincident with a change in personnel or a
breakdown of the underlying amity.
Trading partnerships can also exist and flourish in the absence of trust.
In such arms' length transactions, the parties are keen to find some way of
guaranteeing their counterpart's performance. Written contracts can help
assuage doubt. Other risk-minimizing strategies, such as requiring
prepayment or imposing punitive damages for noncompliance, can be used
in tandem with, or in lieu of, written contracts.29
The use of, and reliance upon, contracts-whether written or oral-can
also be influenced by a firm's faith in the legal system. This factor has
been less thoroughly explored in the literature. Perhaps this is because the
bulk of the theorizing as well as the empirical research has been grounded
in the experience of the United States where a functional legal system is
taken for granted.30 This is not to idealize U.S. courts. Businesses have
27 Williamson, supra note 24, at 463.
28 In Williamson's words:
In effect, institutional environments that provide general purpose safeguards
relieve the need for added transaction-specific supports. Accordingly, transactions
that are viable in an institutional environment that provides strong safeguards may
be nonviable in institutional environments that are weak-because it is not cost-
effective for the parties to craft transaction-specific governance in the latter
circumstances. Williamson, supra note 24, at 476.
In Lynne Zucker's work, she develops the concept of "institution-based" trust in which
formal mechanisms are used to provide trust that does not rest on personal characteristics or
on past history of exchange. Lynne G. Zucker, Production of Trust: Institutional Sources of
Economic Structure, 1840-1920, 8 RES. IN ORG. BEHAv. 53, 61-62 (1986).
29 See e.g., Edward H. Lorenz, Neither Friends Nor Strangers: Informal Networks of
Subcontracting in French Industry, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE
RELATIONS 194-210, 198-201 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988); Brian Uzzi, The Sources and
Consequences of Embeddedness for the Economic Performance of Organizations: The
Network Effect, 61 AM. Soc. REV. 674 (1996); Hendley et al., supra note 10.
30 See, e.g., Macaulay, supra note 18; see also George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The
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uniformly found litigation to be costly in terms of time and money.3' But
such problems are leagues removed from those reported to plague the legal
systems in Russia and other post-Soviet states. 32  The widely-held
perception that litigation is futile in Russia has been fueled by the relentless
publication in major Russian newspapers of Dickensian horror stories of
court cases gone horribly wrong. My research reveals the extent to which
the rumors about the shortcomings of the courts affected the use of, and
reliance upon, written contracts. Logically, enterprises might shy away
from written contracts if they are skeptical about the capacity of the courts
to enforce them. On the other hand, relationships grounded in trust
(especially personal trust) are based on an expectation of self-enforcement.
Hence, the ability to enforce contracts via legal mechanisms is less
consequential.
III. THE ROLE OF CONTRACTS IN THE SOVIET PLANNED
ECONOMY
Just as firms' relationships with their trading partners and the
perceived reliability of legal institutions can affect the appeal of written
contracts, so too can firms' experience with using them. As in other
countries making the transition from state socialism, contracts have a
curious history in Russia. During the decades of Soviet power, the
commitment to a planned economy constricted but did not obliterate the
role of contracts.3 4 To be sure, managers of Soviet state-owned enterprises
were not allowed to pick their trading partners, 35 nor did they have much
control over the terms of trade. The industrial ministries generated standard
form contracts (tipovye dogovory) that enterprises were required to use.
Thus, managers who came of age during the Soviet period were accustomed
to using written contracts.
Arranging the specifics of the transactions was left to enterprise
managers. Not surprisingly, the terms of the form contracts did not always
Selection ofDisputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
31 See generally Priest & Klein, supra note 30.
32 See generally John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Private Order under
Dysfunctional Public Order, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2421 (2000).
3 For a sampling of articles detailing disputes in the arbitrazh courts that had dragged
out for over five years, see e.g., M. Volodarova, Poka vlasti razburaiutsia-mozhet
babakhnut' [While the Powers Deliberate - Things Could Fall Apart], GUBERNSKIE VESTI
(Sept. 1996) No. 37 [weekly], at 2; Irina Skibinskaia, V bitve za aspirin nemtsi otstupaiut [In
the Battle for Aspirin, the Germans Are Retreating), INTEFAKS AiF, June 30, 1997; Aleksei
Tarasov, Lesoruby Sibiri mogut prevrat'sia v 'zelenykh' [Siberian Lumberjacks May Lie
About Turning into "Greens"], IZVESTIA, April 16, 1997.
34 See generally Heidi Kroll, The Role of Contracts in the Soviet Economy, 40 SOVIET
STUD. 349 (1988).
3 See JAMEs R. MILLAR, THE ABCs OF SOVIET SOCIALISM (1981) (giving an overview of
the planning process in the Soviet Union).
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suit their circumstances. Given that prices were a non-issue, disagreements
tended to center on concerns over the quality of the goods to be supplied
and the timing of their delivery. The form contracts could be adapted to
particular circumstances through addenda, known as "protocols of
disagreement" (protokol raznoglasiia). Customers that were worried
about getting shoddy goods or getting them in a less-than-timely fashion
that might compromise their ability to meet the periodic output targets of
the plan might attempt to alter the wording of one or more sections of the
form contract in order to provide additional incentives to their suppliers.
For example, they might move up the delivery date, impose some sort of
punitive sanctions for non-compliance, or both. They would do this by
sending a protokol raznoglasiia to the supplier in which they proposed new
wording for one or more sections of the form contract. If the supplier was
agreeable, its representative would sign the protokol, making it part of the
contract and binding on the parties. But the supplier was not obligated to go
along with the whims of its customers, and in light of the shortages that
typified the Soviet economy, the supplier had considerable leverage. Often
the parties went back and forth several times before agreeing on the final
wording of the disputed sections. Though these protokoly were
cumbersome, they were an ingenious way of satisfying the bureaucrats as to
the uniformity of transactions while incorporating just enough specificity at
the edges to make them workable.
Though these relationships were not initiated voluntarily, the managers
had to figure out a way to work together. Their shared difficulties, such as
perennial shortages and overly optimistic production targets, created a kind
of camaraderie that bound them together. Managers learned what they
could expect from one another. They learned not just which suppliers lived
up to their official obligations, but which of them could be counted upon to
help out in a pinch. Production bottlenecks were a fact of life for these
managers. They coped by hoarding key inputs but sometimes got caught
short. In such cases, they might make an under-the-table appeal to their
regular suppliers, recognizing that there would be a quid pro quo. Without
these sorts of accommodations, the Soviet economy would have become
immobilized.38 Yet they were not part of the plan. Like all transactions that
36 See Hendley et al., supra note 11, at 843-47 (analyzing how these instruments were
used by firms that participated in the 1997 survey).
3 This behavior is reminiscent of the "battle of the forms" familiar to scholars of U.S.
contract law. See generally Victor P. Goldberg, The "Battle of the Forms": Fairness,
Efficiency, and the Best-Shot Rule, 76 OR. L. REV. 155 (1997); John E. Murray, Jr., The
Definitive "Battle ofthe Forms ": Chaos Revisited, 20 J.L. & COM. 1 (2000).
38 See generally JOSEPH S. BERLINER, FACTORY AND MANAGER IN THE U.S.S.R. (1957);
DAVID GRANICK, THE RED EXECUTIVE: A STUDY OF THE ORGANIZATION MAN IN RUSSIAN
INDUSTRY (1960) (providing a window into both the formal and informal mechanisms by
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take place in the shadows, a modicum of trust among the participants was
required. Sometimes this trust was grudging or, in Williamson's terms,
calculative.39 Not infrequently, the bunker mentality that pervaded Soviet
industry allowed genuine friendships to blossom among trading partners.
These friendships, in turn, made the underlying trading partnership stronger
and more resilient.
To what extent did the use of written contracts translate into reliance
upon them? If a supplier failed to deliver the goods on time or shipped
shoddy goods, its customer had to find a way to get that supplier to live up
to his word. After all, the customer could not seek out replacement goods;
it had no alternatives to the supplier it had been assigned by the ministry.
Nor could its production profile be adapted to take account of the
unavailability of a key input. The specifications of the plan had to be met,
both in terms of the quantity and type of goods produced. When confronted
with this sort of problem, managers made every effort to persuade the
recalcitrant supplier to perform. 40 However, the domino effect of shortages
often made that impossible. Therefore, the managers' next step was to seek
assistance from their bureaucratic superiors at the ministry or, failing that,
from Communist Party officials. These officials did not act out of a concern
for the sanctity of the contracts. In all likelihood, they were oblivious to the
details of the contract. Instead, the officials got involved in order to ensure
that the enterprise met its obligations under the plan. If the officials failed
to do so, there would not only be a domino effect throughout the economy,
but they and their subordinates would have to answer for the enterprise's
shortfall (as would enterprise management). Political exigencies routinely
trumped legal niceties. Though legal mechanisms existed that could, in
theory, be used to compel the supplier to perform, they were rarely used.
When they were, the goal was to signal that the failure to meet the plan
targets was someone else's fault. No one actually thought that state
arbitrazh (or gosarbitrazh), the administrative agency charged with
handling disputes between state enterprises, had the power to override the41
wishes of the Party even if that is what a contract would seem to require.
In the Soviet Union, power was concentrated within the Party and was
exercised by its minions-not by legal institutions.4 2
39 Williamson, supra note 24, at 463.
4o See generally Heidi Kroll, Breach of Contract in the Soviet Economy, 16 J. LEGAL
STUD. 119 (1987) (illustrating how the contracting process worked in the U.S.S.R.).
41 See Stanislaw Pomorski, State Arbitrazh in the U.S.S.R.: Development, Functions,
Organization, 9 RUTGERS-CAM. L.J. 61 (1977) (providing a thorough overview of how
gosarbitrazh worked).
42 See ED A. HEWETr, REFORMING THE SOVIET ECONOMY: EQUALITY VERSUS EFFICIENCY
162-70 (1988) (describing the role of the Communist Party in the Soviet economy).
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IV. THE SHIFT IN THE ROLE OF CONTRACTS IN POST-SOVIET
RUSSIA
The role of contracts ostensibly changed with the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Enterprise managers were empowered to pick their own
trading partners and to determine their own terms of trade. Yet many
"shotgun marriages" persisted. Information about alternatives was scarce
and unreliable. Managers no doubt reasoned that the devil they knew was
better than the one they didn't. Somewhat ironically, the introduction of
market mechanisms undermined the stability of trading relationships.
Having grown accustomed to the state bailing them out during Soviet era,43
enterprises were unprepared for the rigors of the market. They failed to pay
for goods and services, and debts mounted quickly." The efforts of
enterprise managers to devise mechanisms for assessing customers'
creditworthiness fell short.45 Duplicitous businessmen are of course not
unique to Russia, but they gained a foothold that eluded them elsewhere due
in large measure to the absence or weakness of key market institutions.
Managers had no reliable way of checking the credit history of prospective
clients.
As non-payment grew ever more commonplace, the inadequacy of
reputational sanctions became apparent to all. The combination of a
business culture that did not punish contractual breaches and a judicial
system that made recovering through the courts difficult resulted in
managers violating their contractual obligations with impunity. Non-
payments dominated the docket of contractual disputes heard by the
arbitrazh courts.46 As I have documented elsewhere, only a tiny percentage
of disputes involving non-payments were brought to the courts.4 7  In the
1997 survey of 328 enterprises, general directors were asked to rank the
43 These perennial bailouts are known as a "soft budget constraint." Market reforms
endeavored to "harden" budget constraints by forcing management to live within its means.
See generally JANOS KORNAI, THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
COMMUNISM 140-48 (1992) (discussing soft and hard budget constraints).
44 See generally Barry W. Ickes & Randi Ryterman, Roadblock to Economic Reform:
Inter-Enterprise Debt and the Transition to the Market, 9 PosT-SOVIET AFF. 231 (1993);
Selcuk Caner & Manouchehr Mokhtari, Arrears and Their Implications for Economic
Performance in the Russian Federation, Russ. AND E. EUR. FIN. & TRADE, Sept. -Oct. 2000,
at 27.
45 The survey findings show that enterprises used a credit rating agency to investigate the
ability of customers to pay in only 4% of transactions. See e.g., Hendley et al., supra note 10,
at 639.
46 In 2001, over 95% of contractual cases resolved by the arbitrazh courts involved non-
payments. Sudebno-arbitrazhnaia statistika: Osnovnye pokazateli raboty arbitrazhnykh
sudov Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 2000-2001 godakh. Vestnik Vysshego Arbitrazhnogo Suda
[Judicial-Arbitrazh Statistics: The Main Indicators of the Work of the Arbitrazh Courts of
the Russian Federaion in 2000-2001, Bulletin of the Higher Arbitrazh Court], 2002, No. 4
[monthly], at 20-29.
47 See Hendley, Beyond the Tip of the Iceberg, supra note 3.
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seriousness of customer arrears on a zero to ten scale. Sixty percent of the
respondents gave scores of seven or higher, with one-third giving scores of
ten.48 This clearly indicates the pervasive and critical importance of non-
payments for Russian enterprises.
As the case studies illustrate, enterprises responded differently to the
challenges posed by the persistent unwillingness and/or inability of their
customers to pay. Some saw contracts as their salvation and devoted
considerable energy to enhancing their remedies in case of non-
performance. Others eschewed contracts, limiting themselves to doing
business on the basis of prepayment and/or simple barter exchanges. The
ephemeral nature of these transactions rendered contracts largely
superfluous. Through the following case studies, the factors that shape
enterprise behavior in this arena can be pieced together.
V. THE CASE STUDIES
A. Feigned Contracts
Moskovskaia Bytovaia Tekhnika (MBT),49 located in the northern
outskirts of Moscow, began producing consumer goods in 1923. Its
production profile had been updated periodically to take account of
advances in technology. Though consumer goods were something of an
afterthought for the Soviet system, its trophy cases and walls were jammed
with awards bestowed during the Soviet era. When I visited in early 1998,
MBT's primary output was men's electric razors, though management was
experimenting with other home appliances, such as coffee grinders and
juicers. MBT struggled to stay alive during the transition, as the Russian
market had been flooded with foreign goods that were not only better
quality and cheaper, but also more effectively marketed than MBTs output.
Between 1992 and 1997, 60% of the work force was laid off.'o During the
late 1990s, delays in the payment of wages averaged three months." When
walking around the MBT facility, the silence could be deafening. Several
managers spoke nostalgically about how the place used to bustle with
activity. One commented to me that it had become a "ghost town."
MBT did not have its own stores. Its customer base was made up
primarily of stores and kiosks located throughout Russia that were owned
by others. The instability of the retail sector made their customer base
unsteady and complicated the task of identifying new customers. Though
48 Id. at 22.
49 The names of the case study enterprises have been changed in order to preserve their
anonymity.
o In 1992, ABThad 1,000 employees. By 1997, only 350 remained.
51 See generally PADMA DESAI & TODD IDSON, WORK WITHOUT WAGES: RUSSIA'S
NONPAYMENT CRisIS 48-59 (2000) (discussing that wage delays were a common coping
mechanism for Russian industrial firms during the transition).
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MBT supplied over 300 retail establishments as of 1998, only about 20%
were long-term customers. The remaining retail establishments were
transient. The story was much the same for the procurement department.
There was a core group of carryover suppliers from the Soviet era with
which MBT worked regularly. But the downturn in MBT's production
level, which translated into smaller orders from suppliers, made it
unappealing to many potential suppliers. As a result, the bulk of inputs
were obtained from an ever-shifting group of suppliers.
MBT began life as a state-owned enterprise, but was transformed into
12
an open joint-stock company through privatization in February 1993. As
of 1998, most of the stock was held by outsiders, including a 42% stake
owned by an American consumer goods company and a 25% stake retained
by the Moscow city government. The five-person board of directors
included ABT's general director and another manager, as well as
representatives of the American company and of the Moscow city
government.
MBT relied on written contracts to govern its interactions with trading
partners. Its behavior during the contracting process betrayed a
selfishness-or perhaps more fairly, a self-protectiveness-almost surely
borne out of the unstable economic conditions of the 1990s.
Like most manufacturers of consumer goods in Russia, MBT found its
customers at trade shows. Its primary representative at these events was the
sales director. She arrived with a stack of MBT's form sales contracts that
were pre-signed. These were made available to prospective customers at
MBT's booth. As might be expected, it was the sales director's job to
convince buyers to sign up with MBT. Many did, but relatively few of
these apparently fully executed contracts actually turned into real business
for MBT. For example, when I spoke with the sales director in early 1998,
there were over 300 of these form contracts in the files that had been signed
by both sides, but she estimated that only about fifty-five of them
represented ongoing relationships-that is, customers that ordered from
MBT on a regular basis.
What explains MBTs failure to honor the majority of contracts it
executed at trade shows? The answer lies in MBT's understanding of these
documents. Though labeled as contracts, MBT did not regard them as
binding. Technically they were not. The Russian Civil Code requires that
sales contracts specify the type and quantity of goods.5 3 M.BTs form sales
contract sidestepped this requirement by moving this information into an
52 ABT privatized via Option 2, which allowed enterprise employees to purchase 49% of
the capital stock under advantageous terms. There was a bit of skirmish between the general
director, who favored Option 1, and the workers, who backed Option 2. See MAXIM
BOYCKo, ANDREI SHLEIFER & ROBERT VISHNY, PRIVATIZING RusSIA 76-81 (1995)
(describing the three options for the privatization of state enterprises).
s3 Civil Code, supra note 15, at art. 455.
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attachment. It provided that "[t]he Supplier is obliged to transfer and the
Buyer is to accept and pay for goods in the assortment, quantity and in the
term set forth in the Specification, or 'Order of the Buyer,' which is an
integral part of the Contract." But the details of this attachment were rarely
negotiated at trade shows. In essence, what the sales director brought home
were "feigned" contracts. They looked like contracts and contained many
elements customarily found in contracts but, in actuality, they represented
little more than an expression of interest on the part of the customer. They
imposed no obligation on the part of MBT to ship goods, nor did they
impose an obligation on the part of the buyer to accept or pay for goods.
Why bother? What advantage did MT gain by collecting these
"feigned" contracts at trade shows? The answer depends on whether or not
a trading relationship develops. If it did not-that is, if MBT had no further
inquiries from the prospective customer-then the "feigned" contract was
worthless. The document simply gathered dust in MB7s files. It was a lost
opportunity for MBT but represented no real tangible cost because the sales
director offered the form contracts on a take-it-or-leave-it basis at trade
shows. On the other hand, if MBT received an order, then the seemingly
meaningless language governed the transaction.
The form contract was four pages and laid out MBT's expectations for
both sides, including how and when the buyer was to make payment as well
as MBTs obligations regarding the quality of the goods. Having these
additional terms in place and having the opportunity to frame them in
language that best served its interests helped MBT. To be sure, the
transaction could have gone forward without a written agreement between
the parties on these issues. The order, taken together with the shipping
documents and the affidavit of receipt, constituted a binding agreement,
obligating the buyer to pay. In that case, however, any subsequent
disagreement between the parties would be governed by the default rules
contained in the Civil Code. The form contract allowed MBT to adapt these
rules to its circumstances. It could not lower the bar, i.e., the terms had to
be within the parameters established by the Civil Code, but this still left it
with a wide range of options. MBTs form contract did not depart
significantly from the Civil Code standards, but merely by clarifying the
parties' duties, it made it easier to go after delinquent customers. For
example, the Civil Code allows the parties complete latitude in deciding
when the buyer must pay for goods. If the contract is silent on this issue or
if there is no written contract, then the Code provides that payment must be
made within "a reasonable time after the origin of the obligation."5 4
Precisely what constitutes a "reasonable time" can vary based on a
particular sector's standards, giving rise to uncertainty." By specifying a
54 Civil Code, supra note 15, at arts. 314, 488.
ss An influential commentary to the Civil Code argues that if the contract is silent, then
the general rule is that payment has to be made within seven days. At the same time, the
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time period, MBT left no doubt as to the liability of recalcitrant customers,
thus providing little incentive for them to push the dispute into court, given
that the outcome was not in question. In this way, having a written
agreement lowered the transaction costs associated with disputing.
Even the combination of a signed form sales contract and a concrete
order was not regarded by MBT as establishing a binding obligation to ship
goods. Rather, it was treated as an offer, requiring MBT's sales department
to respond. This was the moment of truth for MBT. Acceptance hinged on
the sales director's assessment of the creditworthiness of the customer. She
was constantly refining her evaluation strategy, to little avail. In the wake
of the collapse of the planned economy, her informal networks had broken
down. She used to check on the veracity of customers' claims with her
counterparts at other enterprises, but no more. She could no longer be sure
that the information she received from these counterparts was accurate or
complete. Experience taught her that glowing recommendations had often
been bought and paid for by customers. She had long ago stopped relying
on what the customers told her about their credit history. Indeed, she told
me that she no longer bothered to ask them much about their track record,
certain that they would embellish the truth and believing that merely asking
the questions would mark her as naive. Formal indicators of solvency had
likewise let her down. By the time I encountered the sales director, her
cynicism was in full flower. In her view, any document-whether a bank
certification of enterprise solvency or an affidavit from the tax
inspectorate-could be forged and was regularly forged by unscrupulous
customers. Indeed, she related as typical the example of a customer who
fabricated an entire set of supporting documents, everything from a
corporate charter to bank statements. This left her at an impasse. Though
charged with weeding out the untrustworthy customers, she was unable to
find reliable predictors of customer behavior.
How, then, did the MBT sales director maneuver through this
minefield of mendacity? She cobbled together a strategy that combined her
intuition about prospective customers with formal documentation of their
existence and credit history. My review of the files indicated that the
documents most commonly demanded were: (1) copies of corporate
charters along with evidence that they had been registered with the
appropriate state authorities; (2) affidavits from the bank(s) where the
customers had accounts documenting their balance and verifying that no
liens were pending; and (3) certification as to their good standing with the
tax inspectorate. For example, a file for a store in Saratov contained an
affidavit from its bank confirming that, "the enterprise is financially stable,
commentary authors also note that this presumption can be challenged based on sectoral
standards. Kbmmentarii chasti pervoi grazhdanskogo kodeksa Rossiiskoi Federatsii dlia
predprinimatelei [Commentary on Part One of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation for
Entrepreneurs], 277 (M.I. Braginskii ed., 1996).
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it fulfills its payment obligations in a timely and complete fashion, and has
no debts at the bank." Another file for a Moscow department store included
a handwritten note that it "pays badly," though the source of that conclusion
was unclear. Sure enough, AMT declined to ship goods to that store. In the
relatively rare instances when the customer was an individual rather than a
legal entity, the sales director's natural suspicion was heightened because
she realized that individuals were inherently more slippery than firms. As a
rule, she required cash up front from individuals. Even then, she demanded
that they provide her with copies of their passport in order to document
their existence. This documentation, where present, certainly informed her
decision but was not conclusive. Indeed, of the forty-seven contracts
dealing with sales from 1997 that I sampled from MBTs files, less than half
(nineteen or 40.4%) had supporting documentation. In the final analysis,
the sales director relied on her gut instinct. She had headed the sales
department since MTs privatization and, consequently, had an
encyclopedic knowledge of its customer base. Though she did not trust any
of her customers completely, she trusted her ability to detect unacceptable
levels of duplicity and was comfortable taking sole responsibility for
deciding whether to go forward with a proposed sale.
Once there was an agreement in principle56 to go forward, the two
sides had to agree on terms. Not all prospective customers were
comfortable with the conditions set forth in MBs standard contract. The
sales director (not the in-house lawyer) was the face and voice of WT
during any bargaining.57 Although she avoided lengthy negotiations during
trade shows, she was willing to follow up and work with interested
customers to reach an accord. She did, however, insist on using MBTs
form contract as the starting point because she did not want to expend her
staff's time evaluating other enterprises' form contracts. Relatively few
customers objected. It was standard practice for the seller's form to serve
as the basis for sales contracts. The two sides then worked out their
differences by using "protocols of disagreement." As I note above, this
practice evolved during the Soviet period when enterprises were required to
56 This agreement was akin to the "blanket orders" used in many sectors of U.S. industry.
Just as with "blanket orders," MBTs customers would send orders from time to time when
they needed a specific number of razors. See generally Caroline N. Bruckel, Consideration
in Exclusive and Nonexclusive Open Quantity Contracts Under the U. C.C.: A Proposal for a
New System of Validation, 68 MINN. L. REv. 117, 140-52 (1983); Stewart Macaulay, The
Standardized Contracts of the United States Automobile Manufacturers, 7 INT'L
ENCYCLOPEDIA COMP. L. Ch. 3, Sec 3-21 to 3-30 (1973).
5 For more on the role of the in-house counsel at MBT, see Hendley, In-House Counsel,
supra note 3.
5 Some of the large department stores in Moscow refused to use vendors' form contracts.
Their rationale mirrored that of MBT, namely they do not want to waste staff time analyzing
other firms' contracts. According to the sales director, MBT passed on sales under those
circumstances, advising the store to buy MBTs goods through a middleman who was willing
to accede to the store's terms.
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use form contracts generated by the industrial ministries. I was surprised
that this somewhat awkward method of revising contracts persisted in an
era in which freedom of contract had been reestablished. When I asked
ABT's in-house lawyer about this, she reacted defensively, pointing out that
nothing in the revised Civil Code precluded the use of these protokoly. I
agreed, but asked whether, in an age of computer-generated contracts, it
might not be more efficient to incorporate the agreed-upon changes into a
new contract rather than gumming up the file with numerous protokoly. I
noted that in my review of MBTs records, I had found several files in
which the parties had circulated a protokol, which had not been signed by
both sides, thereby creating doubt as to the terms of the contract.59  She
conceded that this was a disadvantage to the protokol system but said that
she was more comfortable carrying on as she had been trained. Despite
what appeared to my outsider's eyes to be the patent inefficiency of
protokoly, the sales department agreed.
According to the sales department personnel, the use of protokoly was
the exception rather than the rule. My review of MBJs files provided
further confirmation. Of the forty-seven contracts I sampled from 1997,
only nine (19.2%) included a protokol.60  The issues raised were
predictable. Typically, they related to payment terms, quality concerns, or
remedies for non-performance. MBTs form contract did not predetermine
the number of days within which the customer had to pay, leaving this
decision to the discretion of the sales department. As a rule, customers were
required to pay within twenty days of receipt of the goods. Requests for
longer grace periods were granted only if the quantities involved were
unusually large. MBT was less troubled by requests for modifications in the
terms governing quality standards. Without exception, such requests were
granted in the files I reviewed.6 ' But MBT was more persnickety when it
came to potential sanctions for contractual breaches by buyers. Its form
contract provided for penalties on late payments in the amount of 0.05% per
day of the amount owed.62 Not surprisingly, customers tried to pare down
5 Three of the nine contracts that had protokoly were not fully executed. Goods had
been shipped to these three customers. The files did not indicate any difficulties over
payment and, therefore, the terms of the contract receded in importance. Had problems
arisen, the lack of clarity over whether the proposed revisions had been accepted by both
sides would have complicated the task of collecting. This is analogous to the problem that
arises in U.S. contract law when trading partners exchange forms and neglect to pay
attention to the discrepancies between the so-called "boiler plate" language. See Macaulay,
supra note 18, at 59-60 (discussing the battle of the forms).
60 This corresponds with the incidence of protokoly reported in the survey. The mean
percentage of contracts that involved a protokol for the respondent enterprises was 20.6%. It
is worth nothing that a significant number of surveyed enterprises (23%) had no experience
whatsoever with protokoly.
61 Two-thirds of the protokoly (six of nine) asked for changes to the section(s) of MBTs
standard contract dealing with the quality of its goods.
62 The evolution of the rules governing punitive damages is set forth below. See infra
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this obligation. About half of the protokoly (five of nine) called for changes
to the penalty clause. Some even tried to eliminate it. The sales director
was uniformly unsympathetic to such demands. If a customer pressed the
point, she tended to walk away. Given that the provision became relevant
only in case of non-payment, she worried that an insistence on lower-than-
normal penalties was an indicator of an intention not to pay. She told me
that she often responded to such customers by asking, "do you want to work
with us or litigate?" MBT was less dogmatic when it came to the provision
of its form contract that fined customers for returning goods; it acceded to
all requests to void that section.
With or without protokoly, the contracts between MBT and its
customers were simple and straightforward. They documented the
agreement between the parties and guaranteed MBT the broadest possible
spectrum of remedies in the event the customer failed to remit payment.
The sales department was adamant about the need for written contracts with
all customers, yielding only for spot sales. Yet when the terms of MBTs
form contract are compared to the Civil Code's default rules, it becomes
clear that the legal burdens imposed are almost indistinguishable. The Civil
Code contemplated the penalties that the sales department forced on
reluctant customers, and the Code did not require any special agreement
between the parties. But no one at MBT had done this analysis. Though
they claimed that their insistence on written contracts was motivated by a
desire to maximize MBTs legal protection, the more likely explanation was
that they used contracts because they had always used contracts.
Interestingly, for MBT, having the signed contract in hand seemed to
provide a sense of comfort. No doubt having written contracts was
appealing because it sent a signal to their customers that the agreement was
being taken seriously and that failure to live up to the promises made in the
contract would carry consequences. In an era when non-payments had
become commonplace, MBTs managers were eager for their customers to
understand that they would not tolerate such behavior. As I have
documented elsewhere,6 3 the MBT sales department did not tolerate non-
payments and had no compunctions about suing recalcitrant customers.
Like most Russian consumer goods manufacturers in the 1990s, MBT
was eager to find new markets but had to be constantly on guard against
customers that could not or would not pay for goods. In a perfect world,
MBT would have protected itself by demanding payment in advance of
shipment. But the market for household appliances was very competitive.
In the view of the sales director, if MBT had insisted on full prepayment, its
orders would have dried up. She did require a down payment from new
customers but waived it after about six months of steady trading. Rather
than protecting MBT's interests by consistently requiring prepayment, she
Part VI. p. 137-39.
63 Hendley, supra note 3, at 23-29.
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did so by picking and choosing among the potential customers. This was
certainly her right, but the way she went about it had the effect of mutating
what appeared to be a bilateral contract-a set of mutual obligations-into
a unilateral contract under which MBT was calling the shots. Once a
customer had signed the contract, MBTs duty to ship goods should have
been triggered by its receipt of an order. Yet the sales department persisted
in treating each order as a discrete offer, which it was free to accept or
reject.64 In late 1997, MBT went further by demanding that customers agree
that MBT could change the price of its goods unilaterally if its costs
increased, rendering negotiations over price pointless.65 My review of other
enterprises' contracts as a part of my research at arbitrazh courts suggests
that such demands by manufacturers were common in Russia in the late
1990s. Having come of age in the Soviet system, which was characterized
by unchanging prices for inputs and energy, the exponential increases that
came with the transition to the market left Russian industrial managers
nonplused. Like their counterparts elsewhere, MBT managers sought to
transfer the risks associated with inflation to their customers. This was
certainly understandable from MBTs perspective, but it resulted in a
skewing of responsibility and allowed MBT to back away at any time with
no consequences.
MBTs behavior vis-a-vis its contractual partners demonstrates that
contracts do not operate in a vacuum. They are adapted to serve the needs
of those using them. MBT was trying to navigate in a sea of uncertainty.
Not only were the prices of its inputs fluctuating wildly, but not paying for
goods had become commonplace and carried no reputational sanctions.
The institutions that it ought to be able to call upon for help, such as credit
rating agencies and banks, were either absent or non-functional.
Consequently, MBT devised a strategy that has allowed it to survive in the
short run. It cast its nets widely for potential customers, even going so far
as to sign contracts with anyone that expresses the slightest interest. But
then it threw many of these customers away if the sales director could not
satisfy herself of their creditworthiness. One shipment was no guarantee
that a customer would be supplied in the future. The sales department
never became complacent, nor did it allow itself the luxury of trusting in the
rectitude of customers, regardless of how long the relationships had existed.
This is not to say that the sales department was unmindful of the importance
of relationships in building and sustaining a trading partnership. Rather, the
sales director and her staff learned through painful experience not to
presume that preexisting relationships or even personal friendships would
guarantee contractual compliance. Interestingly, they did not regard
6 By doing so, MBT signaled that it was not treating the base contract as a "blanket
order." See also Hendley, supra note 57, at 24.
65 The text of one such telegram from a customer read: "We agree to receipt of goods at
the prices of the supplier at the moment of shipment."
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contractual betrayals from long-term partners as personal betrayals, but as
responses to the impossible situation of having debts outweigh income.
They understood that a strong relationship could benefit them when a
customer was making the tough choice of which suppliers to pay. At the
same time, they were resigned to the reality that nothing could guarantee
that they would always come out on the positive end of such calculations.
As a result, trust grew ephemeral and took on a calculative quality. At
MBT, a customer came to be only as trustworthy as its last transaction.
B. Phantom Contracts
Like many firms the world over, MBT looked to its contracts for
protection only when all other alternatives had been exhausted. Even this
limited reliance, however, required that its contracts be carefully drafted.
By contrast, firms that used barter had little need for contracts.
Saratovskii Kauchuk (SK) had more difficulty adjusting to the post-
Soviet reality than did MBT. Located near the center of Saratov, SK had
been producing the hard plastic casing used by manufacturers of vehicle
batteries since 1943. Enterprises that assemble cars, trucks, farm
equipment, and aircraft made up its traditional customer base. Its fortunes
were irrevocably tied to these assembly plants, and as the economic crisis
slowed their production, SK was brought to its knees.66 SK became an open
joint-stock company as a result of privatization in December 1992.
SK survived thanks only to barter.6 8 This tactic had not been much
used during the Soviet era, but became a lifeline for many firms during the
industrial decline of the mid- and late-1990s. 6 9 By 1998, SK was dependent
on barter for 90% of its "sales" of output and its "purchases" of inputs.
SK's top management had resigned itself to this hand-to-mouth existence.
The inability to ensure a steady supply of raw materials and other inputs
gave rise to periodic work stoppages. One of these, which lasted about ten
days, coincided with my fieldwork. Management had attempted to
economize by going onto a four-day work week, but the long delays in
66 For more information on what happened to key auto assembly plants, see Carol
Matlack, Anatomy of a Russian Wreck, Bus. WK., Sept. 7, 1998, at 86 (reporting on
Avtovaz); Gary Peach, Mayor's Industrial Policy Carries Big Costs, Moscow TIMES, Dec.
8, 1998, at 1 (reporting on ZIL); Sujata Rao, Renault, Moskvich Tout New Alliance, Moscow
TIMES, Nov. 4, 1997; Sujata Rao, GAZ Deal Puts Fiat in Russian Race Again, Moscow
TIMES, Sept. 30, 1997.
67 See BOYCKO ET AL., supra note 52, at 78-79 (discussing how, like MBT, SK privatized
via Option 2).
68 For background on the role of barter in the Russian economy during the 1990s, see
generally Jan Amrit Poser, Monetary Disruptions and the Emergence of Barter in FSU
Economies, 10 COMMUNIST ECONOMIES & ECON. TRANSFORMATION 157 (1998); see also
Sergei Aukutsionek, Industrial Barter in Russia, 10 COMMUNIST ECONOMIES & ECON.
TRANSFORMATION 179 (1998).
69 In 1992, barter accounted for 20% of SK's sales and 10% of its supply acquisitions.
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wage payments evidenced the futility of these measures.70 When I visited
the plant in May 1998, workers had yet to receive any wages for that year.
Their lack of hysteria indicated that they were accustomed to coping with
this state of affairs. Those who could find other work had long since
departed. Over half of the workforce had left-whether voluntarily or as a
result of layoffs-since 1992. Only 880 workers remained. Those who
stayed felt that SK was the best they could do.
At first glance, SK appeared to have grounded its relationships with
trading partners in contracts. In my first few days at the enterprise, I found
folders stuffed with fully executed contracts with customers in the files of
the legal department. With only a few exceptions, SK's form sales contract
was used as a starting point, indicating management's desire to control the
terms of the transaction. Not surprisingly, this was not always possible.
Many of the executed contracts had numerous protokoly attached, thereby
evidencing protracted negotiations over the contractual terms.
My conversations with the staff lawyers seemed to confirm the
centrality of contracts to SK's business transactions.n7  They stressed the
importance of memorializing agreements in the form of written contracts.
Although they understood that such written documentation was not required
under Russian law, given that an exchange of letters or any sort of
acknowledged receipt of goods by a customer could be enforced in the
arbitrazh courts, they clearly felt more secure with a contract signed by
both sides. The lawyers took considerable pride in SK's form sales contract,
having had primary responsibility for drafting and revising it. We had
lengthy and detailed discussions of this document in which the lawyers laid
out the reasoning behind the key provisions and explained how these
provisions had evolved over time. The section dealing with penalties for
non-payment had proven to be particularly vexing. At one time, they had
specified the amount of the penalty to be charged to the delinquent
customer, based on a percentage of the unpaid balance. In the most recent
iteration, however, they had simplified the language, giving SK the right to
pursue any remedy allowed under the Civil Code. This drafting decision
preserved all possible options while giving SK management maximum
flexibility in dealing with recalcitrant customers.
As I had the opportunity to talk with managers who were more
involved with the day-to-day business at SK, I came to realize that, in the
immortal words of Shakespeare, the stacks of contracts that I had reviewed
were much ado about nothing. The head of the sales department put it
bluntly when he told me that these contracts present an "artificial picture"
of SK. For the most part, these contracts were never activated. They existed
70 During the last quarter of 1996, 80% of SK's employees had worked less than 40 hours
per week.
71 For a fuller discussion of the role of SK's lawyers in the firm's decision making, see
Hendley, In-House Counsel, supra note 3.
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due to a bizarre combination of inertia and adherence to a now-outdated
etiquette. Each year, SK sent its standard form contract to the customers
with which it had traditionally done business, irrespective of whether these
customers had bought anything recently. Many of the trading partners that
SK inherited from the Soviet era were assembly plants for cars, trucks, and
military machinery. These enterprises never found their footing in the post-
Soviet Russian marketplace, but in the late 1990s they still retained the aura
of power they had earned during the decades of Soviet power. The
machinery produced by these Russian plants, whether intended for the
consumers or for the military, was unable to compete with Western imports.
As demand dried up, their production shriveled. Yet they did not shut
down, hoping against hope for a revival of interest in their output. By
sending them sales contracts, SK's management seemed to be acting as a
kind of enabler, allowing these dinosaurs of the Soviet industry to save
face. What was more curious was that the two sides went through elaborate
negotiations over the terms of these contracts, even though both knew that
they would likely never be activated. A case in point was the contract with
a local factory that, prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, had been one
of the premier aircraft assembly plants in the country.72 In the Soviet era,
being a supplier for such a plant would have been a feather in SK's cap. No
doubt loyalty and gratitude help explain why it was kept on the books as a
customer long after its ability to purchase SK's output had ceased. Less
obvious is why SK engaged in prolonged negotiations with this plant,
giving rise to tangible costs in the form of the time spent by SK managers,
as was evidenced by the protokoly attached to the 1998 contract. After all,
the two enterprises were just shadowboxing with one another. The aircraft
assembly plant purchased none of SK's output during 1997 and the sales
department personnel anticipated no sales during 1998. The situation was
similar with regard to other formerly powerful defense and auto assembly
plants. So why bother with contracts? The sales director confessed that it
was done as a courtesy to these former behemoths of Soviet industry. But
these contracts, which constituted the bulk of those I reviewed at the legal
department, were "phantom" contracts.
If its written contracts were illusory, then how did SK go about selling
its battery blocks? For the most part, its sales took place either through in-
kind exchanges or upon receipt of payment in advance. The sales director
estimated that 90% of SK's sales involved barter.73  Sometimes these
transactions involved a bilateral swap of goods. More often, however, SK
had to put together chains of in-kind exchanges (tsepochki) that would
72 For more background on this enterprise, see Hendley, supra note 13.
7 Likewise, 90% of the supplies needed for production were acquired through barter. SK
was an outlier among the surveyed firms. Among these firms, barter accounted for an
average of 39% of sales and 42% of purchases of needed inputs. Hendley et al., supra note
10, at 640.
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eventually yield the inputs it needed to sustain production. For SK, the first
step was usually to trade its battery blocks for actual batteries that could
then be bartered for much-needed inputs. Regardless of whether the barter
arrangements were bilateral or multi-party, they were memorialized through
an exchange of letters between the parties to each exchange (backed up by
the bills of lading that accompanied the goods). This left SK somewhat
vulnerable when it was part of a barter chain in that there was no single
written contract that bound all the participants. This opened up the
possibility that SK would end up with goods for which it had no use
because the next link in the chain had been broken. This risk was
considered negligible by the sales department personnel. They had
cultivated relationships with several of the firms that had sprung up to
broker deals among cash-poor enterprises during the 1990S,74 and reasoned
that these intermediaries would eventually be able to dispose of anything.75
They were resigned to the reality that these barter transactions might
produce losses for them in the short run. Given their lack of liquidity, they
saw no other way of obtaining the inputs required to maintain production.
The sales department was similarly dismissive of the value of written
contracts with regard to non-barter-related sales. Such sales were made
only on the basis of full prepayment. Beginning in 1996, SK experimented
with various payment regimes. Initially customers were granted a certain
grace period, but SK kept getting burned. Management resolved that the
only way to ensure payment was to have the payment in hand before the
goods were shipped. As a result, the protections afforded by written
contracts were regarded as superfluous. An exchange of letters was viewed
as sufficient.
Why did written contracts recede in importance for SK in the post-
Soviet era? In the view of SK's vice president for economic issues,
contracts had "lost their legal strength." During the Soviet period, SK's
managers viewed contracts as sacrosanct. Contracts brought predictability
and stability to the production process. They set forth the quantity of goods
to be shipped to customers over the course of several years and allowed
manufacturers to plan their production schedules. By the late 1990s, SK
74 As a testament to the importance of these barter agents, a representative from one of
the firms that helped SK arrange barter transactions was on its board of directors.
75 For other examples of barter circles, see Ledeneva, supra note 14, at 120-41, which
argues that less than 5% of all barter in Russian industry was bilateral.
76 In principle, a letter of guarantee from a customer should constitute a binding and
enforceable promise to pay. SK's sales director has avoided them, noting that they are only
as reliable as the enterprise that signs them. Because SK deals mostly with small and poorly
capitalized companies, such letters were viewed as worthless. When I asked the sales
director if he could imagine a situation when he would accept a letter of guarantee in lieu of
prepayment, he responded that he would accept a letter of guarantee from the oblast
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found that a contract represented little more than an inchoate hope on the
part of the customer that it would be able to purchase SK's battery blocks.
Contracts no longer imposed any responsibility or liability on either side.
Because they provided no guarantee of sales, they lost their value for those
close to the production process. Such guarantees came only with concrete
orders, which did not have to be attached to formal contracts. The written
contract laid out the terms that governed such orders, if they were
forthcoming. But experience taught the sales department personnel at SK
that signing a contract did not enhance the likelihood of orders.
Consequently, they saw little point to going through the rigmarole
associated with written contracts. Perhaps if the interactions with
customers had been treated as ongoing, having a contract with mutually
agreed-upon ground rules would have made sense. But SK's practice of
treating each transaction as discrete combined with its preference for
simultaneous exchanges in barter-related transactions and full prepayment
in cash-based transactions left few loose ends. If SK's management was
dissatisfied with the performance of a specific trading partner, they simply
backed away from the transaction preemptively, thereby obviating any
potential liability.
On a superficial level, the yearning of SK management for meaningful
contracts expressed itself in the form of nostalgia for the Soviet system. As
the vice president for economic issues told me, "life was better when
economic relations were controlled centrally." Contracts were concluded
for five years and, in his words, "meant something." His sentiments were
echoed in separate conversations with top officials in the sales department.
They were understandable. For an enterprise like SK, there is little doubt
that life was easier under state socialism. As a downstream producer, the
battery blocks SK manufactured were used primarily by battery makers who
then marketed their wares to consumers and assembly plants. When
everything was planned centrally, they had a prescribed set of customers
and a guaranteed level of output. These guarantees dissipated with the end
of central planning. Had the top management of SK been more resourceful,
they might have found a path to profitability through new product lines or
exports. But these managers, most of whom had been with SK for decades,
were unable to adapt and to find their niche as market incentives were
introduced.
As they looked back through the rosy glasses of nostalgia, SK's
management had conveniently forgotten the restrictions on its freedom of
action that came along with state socialism. In reality, what these managers
longed for was not a return to the past but a return to the sense of stability
and normalcy that they took for granted during the decades of Soviet power.
This sort of security is possible in a market economy, though achieving it
requires different skills than did surviving within a planned economy. The
revised Civil Code, which was the centerpiece of market reforms in Russia,
reintroduced contractual freedom in business transactions after decades of
440
Contracts in Russian Industry
30:417 (2010)
ministerial micro-management of trading relationships." In a perfect
world, this newfound flexibility would have opened up the possibility of
introducing new products and attracting new customers, both within Russia
and abroad. The reality, at least for SK, was darker. The absence of key
market institutions, such as banks that were prepared to offer lines of credit
to industrial enterprises and reliable credit-rating agencies, had a
devastating impact on companies like SK.78  Lacking access to the
investment capital that might have allowed them to rethink their production
profile and to information about potential untapped customer bases, SK was
left scrambling to maintain its Soviet-era levels of production and customer
base. The waves of inter-enterprise arrears that swept over Russian industry
repeatedly during the 1990s only made matters worse as SK and its ilk
adapted to, and struggled to survive in, a cash-free environment.
SK adapted by trusting no one. In Williamson's terms, the SK
managers had given up on personal trust and had become calculative.79
Recognizing that most of their customers' circumstances were just as
precarious as their own, SK's managers assumed duplicity on their part and
acted accordingly. Their policy of requiring customers to pony up before
transferring any SK output to them constitutes convincing evidence of the
suspicion that had come to characterize their interactions with customers.
In a world where no one can be trusted, businessmen typically rely on
detailed written contracts to protect them. But not the SK managers. Even
though they had a workable form sales contract at their disposal, they did
not bother with it because they felt that the very nature of their sales
transactions left no lingering liability. For the most part, they were right.
Problems arose only when members of the sales department let down their
guard and extended trade credit to a once-favored customer. Of course, this
skepticism regarding the bona fides of customers did little to spur the
development of long-term relationships among SK and its customers.
What is most interesting about SK's decision to minimize their reliance
on contracts is that it was not motivated by a lack of faith in the legal
system. Rather, it was the "anything goes" business culture that drove SK's
behavior. Having been socialized in an era of state planning where
managers did not have to worry about balancing the books, the generation
of managers who were leading SK and its trading partners felt no shame
when reneging on contracts. By 1998, SK's chronic inability to pay had
driven away most of their suppliers. SK's customers were similarly
afflicted. In this context, written contracts receded in importance.
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78 See generally JULIET JOHNSON, A FISTFUL OF RUBLES: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE
RUSSIAN BANKING SYSTEM (2000) (discussing the role of banks in Russia in the 1990s).
7 Williamson, supra note 24, at 482-86.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 30:417 (2010)
C. Irrelevant Contracts
Venera, a manufacturer of women's underwear located in
Ekaterinburg, differed from the other case studies in two critical respects.
First, it was not a former state-owned enterprise.80 The general director and
his top lieutenants left jobs at an Ekaterinburg defense plant to create it in
1990, taking advantage of the Gorbachev-era legislation that legalized new
forms of property ownership.81 In 1998, Venera was a closed joint-stock
company with only twenty shareholders. Ninety-eight percent of its stock
was owned by toq management, with the general director holding a
controlling interest. 2 The remaining 2% was held by a former manager
who left to start his own company. Not surprisingly, the board of directors
was composed solely of insiders.
Second, Venera was a profitable and growing business. It first set up
shop in a few rooms in an unused production space on the outskirts of
Ekaterinburg.8 3 Over time, it purchased new capital equipment and
expanded to fill the entire building. It was less hampered by debt than the
other case study firms. It did not rely on barter. Venera fulfilled its
contractual obligations in a timely fashion and expected the same from its
trading partners, though defaults sometimes occurred.84  Wages were
occasionally delayed, but usually by days, not months.8 ' From time to time,
it was delinquent in paying its tax obligations, but this was a short-term
problem, not a perennial sword of Damocles, as was the case for MBT and
SK. Its most serious debts were to local banks for operational loans.86
Venera's success made it attractive to local bankers-at least prior to the
crash of August 1998 87-and its loans were negotiated at arm's length.
The company began life as a cooperative that, according to the general
director, made an extraordinary amount of money "speculating" in deficit
80 12% of the surveyed enterprises had never been state-owned.
81 See generally Peter B. Maggs, Legal Forms of Doing Business in Russia, 18 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 173 (1992).
82 All of these manager-shareholders were men. Even more intriguing, they uniformly
took great pride in the fact that their wives did not work outside the home.
83 Management provided a bus service for workers.
84 As part of the survey, the general director was asked to assess the seriousness of
customers' arrears to Venera on a zero to ten scale. He gave it a score of nine, indicating
that he regarded it as a very serious problem.
85 Wage payments were delayed by ten days in April 1998, and by five days in May
1998.
86 Neither MBT nor SK had substantial bank loans. When asked as part of the survey to
assess the seriousness of arrears to banks on a zero to ten scale, both responded zero. By
contrast, Venera gave a score of nine. Venera's indebtedness to banks marks it as somewhat
unusual among the surveyed enterprises. More than 60% of these enterprises responded like
MBT and SK, with a score of zero. The mean response among all surveyed enterprises was
2.1.
8 For background on how the global economic crisis of 1998 affected Russian banks,
see Johnson, supra note 78, at 201-24.
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goods. It grew from five employees in 1990, to ninety in 1992, to 300 in
1998. At the outset, the only real asset was the general director's access to
key officials at the ministry of construction, with whom he became friendly
while working at the defense plant. Recognizing that profiteering would
wane when state controls on prices were lifted, he began two lines of
manufacturing: parts for television and women's underwear. He and his
staff had no prior experience with either. Within a few years, it became
clear that the greatest opportunities were in producing underwear. It was a
market niche that had been neglected during the decades of Soviet power.
Women were weary of the utilitarian styles of undergarments that had been
available to them. Perhaps because it was a start-up company, Venera was
less flustered by foreign imports. Indeed, it had always seen foreign
companies as its primary competition, dismissing the few enterprises on the
territory of the former Soviet Union that produced these items as hopelessly
out-of-date stylistically.
Vis-d-vis contracts, Venera combined the behavior of MBT with an
attitude that was superficially similar to SK. Its transactions were
thoroughly documented by written contracts, yet these contracts turned out
to be largely irrelevant to the ongoing interactions between Venera and its
trading partners. Any sense of security that Venera's management had in
the reliability of its customers and suppliers was based more in personal
trust than in the seemingly iron-clad guarantees contained in the contract.
Contracts were viewed as a symbol of the commitment of the two parties to
their joint enterprise. Once executed, however, they were filed away and
rarely consulted." When problems arose, Venera's managers preferred to
resolve it bilaterally through negotiations without using or even threatening
to use legal remedies.
This basic attitude that strong relationships were more important than
airtight written contracts was unwavering among Venera's managers. It
emanated from the top. The general director of Venera saw personal
relationships as the key to stability. Venera's sales directors9 o rarely took
88 For most of the Soviet era, profiting from selling shortage goods at premium prices
was considered speculation and was illegal. When cooperatives were legalized in the late
1980s, many of their proprietors (including the future general director of Venera) were able
to find loopholes in the law that freed them to engage in such speculation. These sorts of
activities help explain both the rapid increase in the number of cooperatives (from 8,000 in
1987 to 185,500 in 1990) and the general public's disaffection for them (only 14.7% of those
surveyed in May 1990 had a positive attitude toward them). ANTHONY JONES & WILLIAM
MOSKOFF, Ko-oPs: THE REBIRTH OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE SOVIET UNION 16, 106
(1991).
89 This mirrors the behavior observed by Macaulay in U.S. businesses. Macaulay, supra
note 18, at 59.
90 Venera had two assistant directors (zamistitely direktora) for sales. Their
responsibilities were divided geographically. One concentrated on the European regions of
Russia, while the other focused on Siberia and the Far East. The former had certain
obligations in the realm of security. He visited prospective customers in order to evaluate
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on new business without a preliminary face-to-face meeting during which
they could evaluate the character of potential customers. Like their
counterpart at MBT, these sales directors were skeptical about relying on
documentary proof of customers' good standing, noting the ease of forgery.
The sales department maintained detailed records of who paid when, and
used them to determine the structure of future contracts, e.g. payment terms
and penalties.
In the general director's initial forays into the lingerie market, he was
like the proverbial over-friendly puppy-eager to be loved by all comers
and assuming that any outward show of goodwill was genuine. In his first
visits to trade shows he signed contracts indiscriminately. At the first trade
show at which Venera had a booth to display its wares, he entered into forty
contracts and, at the second, eighty. Though the behavior resembled that of
MBT, the motivations and expectations of Venera's managers reveal it to be
different. To them, these contracts represented the start of beautiful
friendships. The reality was, however, no different than at MBT.
Relatively few of these putative contractual partners actually placed orders
and even fewer lived up to their obligations to pay. The nayvet6 of the
general director and the staff of the sales department was rooted in
inexperience. Neither their short history working as independent brokers
nor their much longer history working as engineers at state-owned defense
plants gave Venera's managers any appreciation of how difficult it could be
to find reliable trading partners. At the third trade show, no contracts were
signed. The general director and his staff understood that they needed to
vet potential customers. At the fourth show, they entered into fifteen
contracts and, at the fifth, forty-two. As this suggests, Venera took a
different path from MBT. Rather than signing contracts first and asking
questions later, Venera's management reversed the process. Consequently,
its files were not overflowing with fully executed but inoperative contracts
but, instead, had a smaller number of contracts with engaged customers.
For the first few years, Venera maintained direct relationships with all
of their customers. About two-thirds of its business was still being run on
this basis in 1998. This was divided fairly evenly between spot sales made
to anyone who showed up with sufficient cash at their production facilities
on the outskirts of Ekaterinburg and shipments to retail outlets. As to the
former, the fleeting nature of these transactions made contracts superfluous;
a simple receipt was sufficient. Most of the customers were shuttle traders
who cared little for legal formalities.91 The rapid turnover among these
their ability to pay and non-paying customers in order to "encourage" them to pay their debts
to Venera.
91 Russians (usually women) who traveled long distances to buy items in bulk and
returned home to sell them on the street or in flea markets were known as "shuttle traders" or
chelnoki. Often they traveled abroad to seek goods, usually to countries that bordered
Russia, such as China, Turkey, and Poland, but the phenomenon also occurred within Russia.
See generally David Hoffman, Russian Shuttle Traders Bear the Burdens of Capitalism,
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traders provided little incentive for Venera's managers to cultivate any sort
of relationship. Indeed, uncertainty as to whether they would ever see a
given trader again motivated their strict cash-only policy.
Another third of Venera's business revolved around retail outlets
across Russia. For the most part, these relationships had begun at trade
shows. All were grounded in written contracts. The source and content of
the contracts depended on the market power of the customer. The yearning
of vendors (including Venera) to sell their wares in the capital gave
Moscow stores a virtual carte blanche. Of the twelve contracts Venera had
signed with Moscow-based stores, all but one was based on the store's form
contract rather than Venera's. By contrast, the ongoing contracts with retail
outlets outside Moscow were, without exception, based on Venera's form
sales contract.
A careful review of the Moscow contracts revealed the terms to be
heavily weighted in favor of the stores. For example, several imposed an
obligation on Venera to remove its lingerie promptly if it did not sell briskly
enough or risk having a fine imposed.92 None contemplated penalties for
failures by the stores to pay in a timely fashion. More telling was the
language dealing with payment. Rather than being required to pay for the
lingerie Venera shipped to them within a certain number of days, many of
these stores paid only if and when the garments were actually sold.9 3
Selling on such terms is regarded as degrading by Russian manufacturers,
as evidenced by the Venera sales directors' vociferous denials that they ever
engaged in these practices. The plain language of the Moscow contracts
proved them wrong. To be fair, these top-of-the-line department stores did
not bicker over contractual terms with vendors, regardless of whether they
were wet behind the ears, like Venera, or household names. They offered
their contracts on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. They understood both the
allure and the financial currency of acceptance into this inner circle of
retailing. Firms like Venera could use their presence on the racks of well-
known Moscow stores to bully their way into smaller stores in the
hinterland. Indeed, the Venera managers visibly puffed up with pride when
talking about their success in Moscow, though they could still list stores in
the capital that remained beyond their grasp.
Venera was more in the catbird seat when it came to stores outside
WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1996, at A24.
92 One store required Venera to remove the offending items within three days of
notification. If it failed to do so, the store was entitled to recover a file equal to 0.1% of the
value of the goods for each day Venera delayed. Other stores had analogous provisions.
The contracts that were not on Venera's form were silent on the question of penalties for late
payments (which was a standard clause in Venera's form contract).
93 Of the twelve contracts Venera had with Moscow stores, nine (75%) required payment
only after sales. Three called for payment to be made immediately upon sale, whereas the
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Moscow. To get a sense of the contrast, I reviewed the twenty-three
contracts with retail outlets in the Far East. All were on Venera's two-page
form contract. Like MBT's standard sales contract, Venera's contract was
not designed to deal with a single sale, but to establish a regime to handle
periodic sales over a year. It left the type of lingerie and the quantity to be
fixed at the time of the sale by an attached order form. It left less leeway on
prices. The parties agreed to be bound by Venera's price list at the time of
shipment, which placed the entire risk of price increases on the customer.
The only blanks left to be completed by the signatories dealt with the terms
of payment. The sales department had to decide whether to ask for
prepayment or whether to extend credit.9 4 Its determination was based on
the track record of the customer with Venera and its more general credit
history as well as its relative market power. Basically, the sales department
personnel had to weigh its desire for the business against the likelihood of
getting paid. These contracts suggest that the size of the vendor plays a
critical role in determining payment terms. Those doing business as
individual entrepreneurs were uniformly required to pay for their goods up
front. More well-established businesses were given greater leeway-
typically they were required to pay within 20 days of delivery. Penalties for
failure to pay were a standard feature of these contracts. The average
amount was 0.2% per day of the amount owed, though it ranged from 0.1%
to 0.5%. As this indicates, the simplicity of the document still left room for
its terms to be subtly skewed in favor of Venera. Because Venera had less
market clout than the Moscow department stores, it could not afford to be
as heavy-handed. In addition to penalties, the contract included a forum
clause that shifted jurisdiction to the local Ekaterinburg arbitrazh court in
case of any dispute, thereby guaranteeing Venera "home court" advantage.
Though this was the provision most commonly challenged through
"protocols of disagreement," a majority of customers accepted it.
The sales department spent very little time negotiating with customers
over contractual language. Its form contract had already been cut to the
bare bones. If a customer objected to any of its provisions and put forward
alternative language in the form of a protocol of disagreements, the sales
department personnel uniformly acceded. Likewise they wasted no time
quibbling with the Moscow department stores over the blatantly one-sided
provisions in these stores' standard contracts. Their behavior reflects their
blas6 attitude toward contracts. Any confidence they had in the likelihood
that their customers would pay on time stemmed from the personal trust
94 Of these twenty-three contracts, eleven (48%) called for full prepayment, five (22%)
provided for payment within twenty days, and the remaining seven (30%) had a variety of
payment terms.
9 If the parties do not otherwise agree in their contract, the law grants jurisdiction to the
court closest to the defendant. Arbitrazhnyi Protessual'nyi Kodeks [APKI [Code of
Arbitration Procedure] art. 25 (Russ.).
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that had been built up over time. Written contracts were necessary to the
trust-building process, but were far from sufficient. Likewise, other
documentary evidence of goodwill, such as bank statements or tax records,
was viewed with skepticism. Like their counterpart at MBT, the sales
directors at Venera realized that any document could be forged and that
relying exclusively on such evidence would be folly. Under these
circumstances the customers' behavior took center stage. Not surprisingly,
Venera's initial stance was to extend credit to no one. Its sliding scale for
prepayment, starting with 100% for the first transaction and gradually
decreasing to zero over the first year of the relationship, provided a critical
test. As this practice became well known among retail outlets, some toed
the line just long enough to get goods on credit and then absconded with
them. To the sales directors, this simply reinforced their belief that
relationships were the key to building a business.
When problems arose with customers, the sales department attempted
to sort it out informally with the goal of reaching a mutually acceptable
accommodation. Neither side relied on the contractual language during
these negotiations, nor did lawyers conduct the negotiations. Occasionally
Venera reminded delinquent customers of its right to pile on penalties if the
debt was not paid, but it never actually went after penalties and the
emptiness of the threat undercut its potency. Likewise, management made
no secret of its distaste for litigation. It had initiated only one lawsuit in its
relatively short history and the experience was disillusioning. They sued a
store in Nizhny-Novgorod when all efforts to resolve the unpaid debt
through negotiations proved unsuccessful. The court ruled in their favor,
but when they went to collect on the judgment, they found the shelves
stripped bare and the bank accounts empty. This undermined their already
shaky confidence in the capacity of legal institutions and strengthened their
resolve to rely on informal enforcement mechanisms. The general director
and the sales directors made a point of getting to know their counterparts.
The sales department kept careful records of their dealings. Particularly
important in shapin6 Venera's attitude toward customers was the veracity
of their managers. The sales directors were willing to forgive
equivocation by low-level personnel, especially if it was not actually false
at the moment. For example, they saw a qualitative difference between the
following two scenarios that might occur after payment has come due. First,
a customer representative calls and explains that the customer was
experiencing financial difficulties but plans to pay the amount owed in ten
days. The payment is, in fact, not made in ten days. Second, a customer
representative calls and expresses surprise that Venera has not received
96 Along similar lines, Macaulay reports that, rather than placing total reliance on written
contracts, U.S. "[b]usinessmen often prefer to rely on 'a man's word' in a brief letter, a
handshake, or 'common honesty and decency'-even when the transaction involves
exposure to serious risks." Macaulay, supra note 18, at 58.
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payment, telling them that the bank had been instructed to make payment.
It later comes to light that no such instructions were ever given. According
to the sales director, while the first untruth was forgivable; the second was
not. Their willingness to tolerate lies dissipated as the place of the liar rose
in the firm hierarchy. Lies of any sort from a customer's general director
were considered beyond the pale and constituted grounds for immediate
termination of the relationship. They saw such behavior as a sign of
disrespect to Venera and a harbinger of worse things to come.
Not surprisingly, the sales department personnel grew weary of the
never-ending chore of assessing the creditworthiness of customers. Just
like their counterparts at MBT, they worked assiduously at gathering
information about the credit practices of prospective and ongoing customers
but found themselves in the position of a modem-day Diogenes, i.e., on a
constant and mostly frustrating search for honest firms. Both of these
enterprises sold their output primarily to retail stores which, during the
1990's, was a chaotic market in Russia. Stores and kiosks tended to be
poorly capitalized, and their proprietorship turned over with startling
frequency. Despite their best efforts, the vetting process remained
somewhat haphazard and was far from foolproof. Arrears mounted quickly
and usually had to be written off. Unlike their counterparts at MBT, who
accepted such problems as a cost of doing business, Venera's management
took steps to reduce these transaction costs.
The general director decided to transition to a system of regionally-
based dealers. The sales department had agitated for this move, arguing
that its personnel were spending too much time verifying the credit-
worthiness of the constantly changing pool of customers. Under the new
system, the burden of ensuring that the customer will pay in a timely
fashion was shouldered by the dealer (rather than Venera). Because the
dealers were geographically closer to the stores and more tied into the local
community, they were better able to assess reliability. This network of
dealers could not, of course, be built overnight. Initially, the general
director concentrated his efforts in the non-European regions of Russia, east
of the Ural Mountains, where the competition for his lingerie was weakest.
He started slowly, beginning in 1993 with just one dealer in Novosibirsk.
By mid-1998, Venera had eight dealers and sales through its dealers
accounted for approximately 30% of annual revenues. All of these dealers
had been hand-picked by the general director; he knew them personally and
believed them to be trustworthy. He took comfort in the fact that, in his
words, Venera and the dealers had "grown up together." Even so, he and
the sales department personnel understood that authorizing these dealers to
act as Venera's agents was far from risk-free. Hundreds, sometimes
thousands of miles, separated them, and they could not be sure how hard the
dealers were trying to sell Venera's output. The contracts between Venera
and its dealers were simple--consisting of just a few pages-and set the
basic terms of trade. In essence, the dealers bought Venera's
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undergarments in bulk, entitling them to price concessions, and endeavored
to resell them through retail outlets in their locale. As a rule, payment was
due fifty business days after receipt, which was more than twice the leeway
granted to most retail outlets with which Venera had individual contracts.
Each dealer held an exclusive right to sell Venera's lingerie in a specified
geographic region and agreed to sell only the Venera brand of lingerie.98
Venera did not compensate the dealers directly. Instead, the dealers'
remuneration came from the mark-ups they placed on the lingerie when
they resold it. The contracts were silent on this issue and thus imposed no
limits on the amounts that could be charged. The sales department left this
to be governed by the market, reasoning that if the mark-ups became
exorbitant, sales would suffer and the dealer would lower its price. Dealers
placed orders on a quarterly basis, which provided enough lead-time to
allow demand to be met. The precise quantities were not specified in the
contract, but were communicated through faxed orders.99 In the early years,
the contracts itemized what the dealers would buy during the upcoming
year. This system was found to be too inflexible to accommodate the
vagaries of consumers in a market environment and was abandoned.
Though the dealers' contracts began as a form contract developed by
Venera, each was carefully modified to suit the specific situation of a single
dealer. On its face, this would seem to indicate that the contracts were
meaningful. The inclusion of penalties for non-performance provides
further supporting evidence. In addition to the standard clause imposing
penalties for late payment, 00 these contracts also allowed Venera to
terminate the contract unilaterally if a dealer's orders dropped below a
predetermined amount. This latter provision was not in the original form
document. It had been added at the insistence of the chief financial officer.
Upon her arrival in 1997, she was astonished to discover that Venera had no
way to extricate itself if a dealer's sales declined. The inclusion of such a
mechanism had already proved its merit on one occasion. Though Venera
9 Price concessions were negotiated on case-by-case basis. The Omsk dealer got a 25%
discount if it bought more than 75 million rubles of Venera's products; others only got a
discount if they prepaid. Venera was keen for prepayment but recognized that its market
position was not strong enough to allow them to demand it. Consequently, it created
positive incentives to encourage prepayment by its dealers.
98 The contract with the dealer based in Khabarovsk lacked the exclusivity clause that
was present in the other dealer contracts. At the time of my field research, it had just been
added to Venera's network. According to one of the sales directors, the two were still
working out the terms of their relationship. Until both were certain of the viability of the
partnership, Venera's management felt it would be unfair to limit the dealer from pursuing
other opportunities.
9 As compared to MBT, the system Venera constructed was a more genuine "blanket
order" system. See also supra note 56.
100 Most of the dealer contracts called for penalties of 0.1% per day on the unpaid
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ultimately decided not to walk away, the availability of termination as a
legal option gave it leverage when negotiating with the under-performing
dealer. My conversations with the general director revealed this reliance on
contractual language to be an aberration,'0 ' though he professed an ambition
to make this behavior the norm. I was uncertain of how genuine his
commitment was to this goal of enforcing contracts. It seemed to me that
he was putting on a good face for the foreign law professor, i.e., trying to
impress me by appearing to be dedicated to contractual compliance. My
skepticism was confirmed by the lack of awareness of the sales department
personnel of this paradigm shift. Questions to the sales directors about the
specifics of these contracts were typically greeted with stares of
incomprehension. When I showed them the contracts, thereby reminding
them of their terms, they could often reconstruct the reasoning behind the
content. But it was painfully evident that these operation-level managers
had not looked at, or thought seriously about, these contracts after signing
them. Rather than relying on the contract and the capacity of the courts to
enforce it, they preferred to rely on the strength of the relationship they had
built (or were building) with their dealers to guarantee mutual performance.
VI. EXPLAINING THE RELUCTANCE OF RUSSIAN MANAGERS
TO RELY ON CONTRACTS
A. The Worldview of Firm Management
In many ways, Venera and MBT were similarly situated. Both
produced goods to be sold to the public through retail outlets owned by
others. Both had to cope with rapid turnover in the retail sector in the late
1990s and with a business climate in which economic actors were less than
forthcoming about their financial wherewithal. Yet their strategies vis-i-vis
contracts were remarkably different. Venera's management team prided
itself on having close personal ties with its dealers and retail customers.
They went through the ritual of negotiating and signing written contracts,
but saw it as part of the bonding process, rather than as a way of protecting
themselves legally. The negotiations allowed them to take the measure of
prospective customers. Their goal was a contractual regime in which the
101 Macaulay's work shows that a distaste for resorting to the language of the contract is
not unique to Russian managers. Writing about U.S. managers, he notes:
Disputes are frequently settled without reference to the contract or potential or
actual legal sanctions. There is a hesitancy to speak of legal rights or to threaten to
sue in these negotiations. Even where the parties have a detailed and carefully
planned agreement which indicates what is to happen if, say, the seller fails to
deliver on time, often they will never refer to the agreement but will negotiate a
solution when the problem arises apparently as if there had never been any original
contract. Macaulay, supra note 18, at 61.
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language of the written contract was irrelevant because the norm of on-time
payment had been woven into the relationships with the customers and
violating that norm would be morally unacceptable to the customers. By
adopting this strategy, Venera's managers betrayed an optimism about
human nature that was unusual among Russian managers in the late 1990s.
Perhaps their shorter track record and their good fortune since starting the
company allowed them to count on the best in others.
By contrast, cynicism was the watchword at MBT. The difference in
the worldviews of the sales directors of the two companies was apparent
from the survey. When asked whether people are basically trustworthy on a
scale from zero (completely untrustworthy) to ten (completely trustworthy),
the MIBT sales director's score of three revealed her skeptical nature,
whereas the Venera sales director was characteristically sanguine with a
score of ten. To be fair, MBTs sales director had been put through the
ringer. When I encountered her in early 1998, she was at her wit's end.
She felt that she had done everything possible to ensure that MBTs
customer base was uniformly financially sound, yet her efforts were
somehow never enough. Whether the customers that defaulted were
unprincipled or merely desperate is unclear, but that distinction was
unimportant from MBTs point of view. The result was the same: MBT was
plagued with customers that could not or would not live up to their
contractual obligations. Unlike Venera, MBT did not respond by
redoubling its efforts to establish personal trust with its customers. Just the
opposite; MBT's sales director openly abandoned any pretense of relying on
the bonds of friendship and gave herself over to calculative trust. In her
words: "friendship is friendship, but work is work." Consequently she
placed more faith in the written contracts themselves and, irrespective of
personal ties, pursued recalcitrant customers to the full extent of the law,
though she opted for litigation only when brass-knuckle negotiations failed.
SK shared the desperation of MBTs customers. Its management was
willing to do whatever it took to survive, but still wanted to put up a good
front. This attitude contributed to the bizarre situation where elaborately
negotiated written contracts languished unused while the real business took
place without the benefit of formal written contracts.
B. Sectoral Uncertainty
Though SK's management may have exacerbated its situation through
poor decisions, its willingness to trust its trading partners was beside the
point. Its options were constrained by its place in the production chain and
its sectoral identity. The entire auto industry, of which SK was a part,
suffered due to Russia's economic depression during the 1990s. The lack
of sales led to a lack of money which, in turn, led to barter transactions.
These barter transactions did not lend themselves to written contracts. Even
when integrated into complicated chains of mutually reinforcing exchanges,
the individual transactions were straightforward in-kind exchanges. There
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were no lingering questions of credit; there was no need to debate what sort
of penalties would be imposed for non-payment. Indeed, non-payment was
not possible for barter transactions. If one side backed out, then the
exchange was abandoned with no damages accruing to either side.
The retail sector was much healthier. More importantly, sales were
made for cash, not as in-kind exchanges. This meant that producers had to
work out terms for payment. The highly competitive nature of the retail
sector gave power to customers. Producers could rarely demand cash up
front. Instead, they had to work out credit arrangements, which gave rise to
uncertainty in terms of repayment. In this context, written contracts were
useful, perhaps even necessary. This explains why both MBT and Venera
routinely concluded written contracts with their customers, even if both
regarded legalistic remedies as a last resort, preferring to resolve problems
through negotiation.
C. The Weakness of the Legal Infrastructure
The three patterns of behavior uncovered in the case studies are unified
by a reluctance to rely primarily on contracts. The reasons for, and extent
of, this hesitancy vary, but the bottom line is the same. A number of
scholars have argued that the attitudes and behavior exhibited by Russian
managers during the 1990s was a direct consequence of the shortcomings in
the substantive law and the courts empowered to enforce it.102 There is no
question that the inadequacies of the legal infrastructure-both real and
perceived-are part of the explanation. But it does not account for the
variants in behavior uncovered through the case studies. To be sure,
Venera's difficulties in getting its judgment against a retailer enforced
soured it on arbitrazh courts, but MBT was a frequent and enthusiastic
litigant. Our survey suggests that MBT was more typical; an astonishing
80% of the enterprises surveyed had been a party to an arbitrazh court case
between 1995 and 1997. Buttressing our findings are the official
caseload statistics, which show a 31% increase in cases decided by the
arbitrazh courts between 1993 and 1998.0
102 See e.g., Hay et al., supra note 6; Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-
Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1911 (1996).
103 Unlike MBT and SK, Venera did not have an in-house lawyer. After Venera prevailed
in its case, the manager handling the case erred in filling out the form (ispolnitel'nyi list)
required to seize the proceeds of the store's bank account. The error was easily fixed, but by
the time the new document was prepared, the defendant had emptied its bank accounts,
rendering itself virtually judgment proof. This was a mistake that the experienced MBT
lawyer would not have made. Venera's reaction-avoiding the courts-was perhaps
overkill. For a fuller discussion of this incident, see Hendley, In-House Counsel, supra note
3.
'0 Hendley et al., supra note 10, at 853.
105 Compare Sudebno-arbitrazhnaia statistika: 0 rabote arbitrazhnykh sudov Rossiiskoi
Federatsii v 1992-94 godakh, Vestnik Vysshego Arbitrazhnogo Suda [Judicial-Arbitrazh
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At the same time, the case studies reveal a common fear that trading
partners would not live up to their contractual obligations. Policy makers
could have done nothing, trusting in the power of market incentives to
persuade economic actors to live up to their agreements. But Russian
officials took a different path. In May 1992, a presidential decree
authorized the imposition of penalties for delinquent payments for goods
and services in the amount of 0.5% per day of the amount of the
outstanding debt. 106 The hope was that these hefty penalties would deter
non-payments. At the same time, penalties were not made mandatory, but
were left to the discretion of the party harmed by the breach. The decree
constrained the parties' freedom to the extent that it limited the penalty rate
that could be imposed.
The Civil Code, passed in 1994, reflected this same approach by
endorsing the use of penalties for breaches of contract.o Honoring the
principle of freedom of contract, the Code did not quantify the rate at which
penalties could be assessed but left that decision to the contractual parties.
The Code included several sections that, taken together, had a somewhat
perverse effect. For example, it incorporated a three-year statute of
limitations for contractual claims, and imposed no affirmative duty to
mitigate damages.108 Therefore, parties could pad their claims by waiting
until the last moment to file.1 09 In addition, the Civil Code allowed claims
for interest as part of non-payment claims.11 o The purpose was to ensure
Statistics: On the Work of the Arbitrazh Courts of the Russian Federation in 1992-1994,
Bulletin of the Higher Arbitrazh Court], 1995 No. 4 [monthly], at 75; with Osnovnye
pokazateli raboty arbitrazhnykh sudov Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 1998-1999 godakh, Vestnik
Vysshego Arbitrazhnogo Suda [Judicial-Arbitrazh Statistics: The Main Indicators of the
Work of the Arbitrazh Courts of the Russian Federation in 1998-1999, Bulletin of the Higher
Arbitrazh Court], 2000, No. 4 [monthly], at 6.
106 PostanovIenie Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta Rossiiskoi Federatsii i Pravitel'stva
RF "0 neotlozhnykh merakh po uluchsheniiu raschetov v narodnom khozyaistve i
povyshenii otvetstvennosti predpriyatii za ikh finansovoe sostoianie." Vedomosti S"ezda
narodnykh deputatov i Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR [Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet of the Russian Federation and Government of the RF "Regarding Urgent Guidelines
for Improving Accounting and Increasing the Responsibility of Enterprises for Their
Financial Condition." Gazette of the Congress of People's Deputies and Supreme Soviet of
the RSFSR], no. 23, item 1252, May 25, 1992.
107 Civil Code arts. 329-32.
1os Civil Code art. 196.
109 Typically this happened when the creditor firm had no realistic hope of collecting.
The creditor would nonetheless file a lawsuit claiming the original debt plus the accrued
penalties. If the debtor firm had no assets, it would not bother to defend the case. The
arbitrazh court would enter a judgment for the full amount, which the creditor firm could use
to offset any profits and reduce its tax liability. The tax authorities took court judgments as
convincing evidence of the existence of the debt. The out-of-pocket costs to the creditor
firm for obtaining the judgment were minimal. See generally, Kathryn Hendley, Business
Litigation in the Transition: A Portrait ofDebt Collection in Russia, 38 LAw & Soc'Y REV.
305 (2004).
"0 Civil Code art. 395.
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that the "victims" of breaches did not suffer doubly due to inflation. The
interest rate was pegged to the discount rate of the Russian Central Bank.
Russian economic actors embraced penalties enthusiastically and
quickly, which undermines the common wisdom that businessmen paid no
attention to law. In my review of hundreds of arbitrazh court files in
Moscow, Saratov, and Ekaterinburg from 1993 to 1997, the increased use
of penalty clauses to punish late payment stood out."' Moreover, the
enterprises surveyed in 1997 reported that more than half of all sales
contracts include penalty clauses. 2 Yet the success or failure of the policy
should not be judged in terms of how often penalty clauses were included or
even how often penalties were collected. The original policy goal was to
enhance contractual discipline and, judged in those terms, penalties failed
miserably. Not only did the non-payments problem persist, but penalties
arguably made matters worse by adding to the mountain of debt carried by
many enterprises. Penalties were often forgiven in the final analysis, but
until then, they weighed down the enterprise since penalties can be included
in the overall debt reflected in bank records.'13 This, in turn, limited the
enterprise's ability to attract outside investment and to carry on ordinary
business.
One reason why penalties proved counter-productive in the Russian
setting was their sheer size. The rate was purposely set high to act as a
negative reinforcement. That, combined with the three-year statute of
limitations and the absence of any duty to mitigate damages, has created an
untenable situation. All too often, the penalties awarded exceeded the
original debt.114 The absurdity of the situation was not lost on either the
participants or the courts. After all, there was little hope that the losing
defendants would be able to pay these judgments. Yet the debt (including
the penalty) would be attached to their bank accounts. Rather than pushing
such enterprises into bankruptcy-as Western advisers might have
predicted-managers worked to avoid having any of their income stream
pass through their bank accounts.'15 This, of course, served no one's
11 See generally Kathryn Hendley, Growing Pains: Balancing Justice & Efficiency in the
Russian Economic Courts, 12 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 302, 319-26 (1998).
112 Hendley et al., supra note 10, at 636.
113 Bank regulations prevailing in the 1990s required banks to keep account of all
outstanding debts of a firm, including debts to other firms and to the state in the form of tax
arrears. Any revenue that came into a debtor firm's account would then automatically be
applied to draw down this debt. For more on how this system worked, see generally
Kathryn Hendley, Payments Problems, supra note 3.
114 See e.g., Hendley, supra note 111, at 324.
115 The bankruptcy code adopted in 1998 facilitated bankruptcies. See generally William
P. Kratzke, Russia's Intractable Economic Problems and the Next Steps in Legal Reform:
Bankruptcy and the De-politicization of Business, 21 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 33-50
(2000). As the Yukos case demonstrated, the Kremlin can use the bankruptcy laws as a
potent weapon. Erin A. Arvedlund & C.J. Chivers, As Deadline Nears, Yukos Faces a $3.4
Billion Tax Bill, N.Y. TIMEs, July 7, 2004, at C6.
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interests.
Beginning in 1997, the situation began to change. Encouraged by an
"Informational Letter" from the Higher Arbitrazh Court, trial court judges
began to reduce penalties."'6 The Court found the authority to do so in a
section of the Civil Code that disallowed penalties that were "clearly
disproportional.""' 7 Gradually, this concretized into a rule that penalties in
excess of the debt were forbidden." 8 The courts also closed the door on
going after both penalties and interest, characterizing it as double-dipping.
Plaintiffs had to elect either compensatory (interest) or punitive (penalties)
damages.
The story of how the mechanism for dealing with non-payments
evolved during the 1990s illuminates how different elements of the state
contributed to the process. In the early days, the executive branch came up
with an admittedly temporary solution that was made redundant by the
passage of the Civil Code in 1994. But when it became clear to judges that
the solution (penalties) was actually making the problem worse, they found
a way out by using a throw-away provision of the Civil Code creatively.
Sadly, what was still missing from the picture was a sense of societal
responsibility. Enterprises that were deep in debt seemed to feel no shame,
nor were they shunned. Reputational sanctions remained weak. This
continues to be a missing link that threatens to undermine the system.
D. The Weakness of Reputational Sanctions
Law works best when treated as a safety net. It can police those who
deviate from societal norms, but cannot serve as the solitary bulwark
against unscrupulousness. This is a universal reality. Macaulay argues that
the norm that "one does not welsh on a deal" is more powerful than the
116 "Informational Letters" are mechanisms by which the Higher Arbitrazh Court conveys
its thoughts on a particular issue to lower courts. They are generally issued when the top
court wants to signal a shift in interpretation. Technically they have only persuasive
authority. In practice, however, they are regarded as binding authority. In this case, the
"Informational Letter" was attached to a summary of judicial practice related to the
reduction of penalties by the courts under Article 333 of the Civil Code. "Informatsionnoe
pis'mo," no. 17, July 14, 1997, Vestnik Vysshego Arbitrazhnogo Suda ["Informational
Letter," no. 17, July 14, 1997, Bulletin of the Higher Arbitrazh Court], 1997, No. 9
[monthly], at 75-80.
"7 Civil Code art. 333. Russia has a civil law legal heritage and, therefore, its courts'
judgments have traditionally not been treated as precedent. In recent years, this has begun to
change. For a survey of the relevant literature, see S.K. Zagainova, 0 pretsedentno-
pravoprimenitel'noi prirode sudebnykh aktov v grazhdanskom i arbitrazhnom prolsesse,
Gosudarstvo i pravo [On the Precedent-Rulemaking Nature of Judicial Acts in the Civil and
Arbitrazh Process, State and Law], 2009, no. 10, at 19-20.
118 See generally Kathryn Hendley, Peter Murrell & Randi Ryterman, Punitive Damages
for Contractual Breaches in Comparative Perspective: The Use of Penalties by Russian
Enterprises, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 639 (2001).
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dictates of the law in ensuring contractual discipline in the U.S. case.119
Along similar lines, McMillan and Woodruff cite examples ranging from
Shasta County ranchers to 19th century Mexican merchants to
contemporary Vietnamese businessmen to support their thesis that when
"interactions are frequent and residents expect them to continue indefinitely
into the future," concerns over the damage to their reputation that would
accompany a contractual breach would ensure compliance.120  They
underscore the power of gossip networks in maintaining cooperative
relations and keeping businessmen honest.
At first glance, the situation in Russia in the late 1990s would seem to
be ripe for the inculcation of such norms of cooperation. After all, many
firms had stuck by their Soviet-era trading partners, even after they were
freed to explore other options. It would be a mistake, however, to view the
enterprises that had worked together during the decades of Soviet power as
communities, with self-enforcing norms of behavior. A community
assumes the free exchange of information. In Soviet trading networks,
participants knew only the firms to which they had been linked by their
industrial ministries. Information was closely guarded. There was no
tradition of the free exchange of information that undergirds a gossip
network that might put out the word that one or another manager was not to
be trusted. Indeed, informal sanctions had no place in a planned economy.
They are aimed at identifying bad actors, with the ultimate goal of
ostracizing such bad actors from the network. This, in turn, assumes that
firm-level managers are able to pick and choose among a wide variety of
trading partners. It further assumes that exit is an option. Neither was true
for a planned economy.
As state price controls were lifted and the machinery of state planning
was discarded in early 1992, firm managers seemed to have almost limitless
opportunities. In reality, they continued to be constrained by the muted
flow of information. In a world where marketing and advertising were in
their infancy and where the idea that sharing information could be
beneficial was considered odd, Russian managers actually had very little
flexibility. They stuck by old trading partners, rarely out of any sense of
community or personal loyalty, but mostly out of desperation. As inter-
enterprise debt mounted, their desperation grew deeper. The options open
to Russian managers were limited and unenviable. They could continue to
throw good money after bad by working with their traditional partners,
many of whom had proven to be unwilling or incapable of living up to their
119 Macaulay, supra note 18, at 63.
120 McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 32, at 2432-33. See also Barak D. Richman, How
Community Institutions Create Economic Advantage: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New
York, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 383 (2006). See also Macaulay, supra note 18, at 63
(emphasizing the importance of the expectation of continuing relations to ensuring
contractual discipline).
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contractual obligations. Alternatively, they could seek out new trading
partners, but without any way to reliably assess their credit-worthiness. Put
bluntly, familiar trading partners were the devil they knew. Sometimes,
these known devils went too far and were tossed aside. SK, which had
become a pariah due to its inability to pay its suppliers, is a good example.
But the decision to fire SK as a customer was made on a bilateral basis by
each of its suppliers. It was not a sanction for violating community norms.
More generally, even though many firms, in fact, engaged in repeated
transactions, they had no sustained expectation of repeated interactions.
They were always waiting for the proverbial shoe to drop. In practical
terms, this meant that they gained few of the benefits that typically inure
under such conditions.'2 ' Bilateral informal norms of self-enforcement
were slow to evolve. Community norms of the sort that Lisa Bernsteinl22
and Barak Richmanl23 uncovered in the diamond trade were scarcer. For
the Russian managers I studied, every deal was a new battle to be fought.
At the heart of the dilemma facing Russian managers in the late 1990s
was the absence of a general consensus that one does not welsh on a deal.
Its absence was yet another legacy of the Soviet era. Trained under state
socialism, managers were never forced to balance their books. Efforts to
shift enterprises over to self-sufficiency had begun under Gorbachev's
perestroika in the mid-1990s, but proceeded slowly.124 Unwilling to risk
the social unrest that might come with bankruptcies and labor dislocations,
the state continued to bailout firms out under Gorbachev. Though some
subsidies persisted under Yeltsin, firms were mostly left on their own. As
inter-enterprise debt spread throughout the economy, it became an accepted
fact of life for industrial enterprises, not an embarrassment. Perhaps it
failed to be perceived negatively because Russians did not make the link
between debt and fault. Certainly they did not see debt as an indicator of
moral depravity. It was often impossible to pinpoint the culprits. Even
firms that were determined to live up to their obligations stumbled when
their customers failed to pay. One after another, firms fell like dominos. A
conversation I had with a Russian businessman in the corridors of the
Moscow City Arbitrazh Court in 1997 is illustrative. He asked how the
United States handled its non-payments problem. I told him that the United
States did not really have a non-payments problem. He was amazed and
asked how this could be possible. I explained the concept of reputational
sanctions, telling him that anyone who regularly welshed on their debts
121 See Simon Deakin, Christel Lanen & Frank Wilkinson, Trust or Law? Towards an
Integrated Theory of Contractual Relations between Firms, 21 J.L. & Soc'Y 329, 334-40
(1994).
122 Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
123 Richman, supra note 119.
124 See generally Hewett, supra note 42, at 322-33.
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would be ostracized. He laughed and told me that any businessman who
paid his debts on time would be regarded as a fool in Russia. This anecdote
shows the extent to which not paying one's debts had become routine. It
follows that if debt is not demonized, then the societal commitment to not
welsh is going to be shallow.
Those of us socialized from birth in a well-established market
environment might wonder why Russian managers of the late 1990s failed
to demand some more effective mechanism for assessing prospective
customers' credit-worthiness. Leaving aside the obvious collective action
problem that arises in a country as thoroughly atomized as the former
Soviet Union, one cannot demand what one does not know exists. This is
the familiar problem of bounded rationality. 125 Most Russian managers
either came of age under state socialism or were trained by others who did.
They were taught how to cajole shortage goods out of reluctant suppliers.
They learned how a strong personal relationship with key managers could
help ensure that they received much-needed inputs in a timely fashion,
thereby allowing them to meet the production targets for their enterprise.
When market reforms came, they adapted these skills to the new conditions.
For those who continued to deal with the same trading partners, much of
what they had learned was transferable. To be sure, they were no longer
trying to pry loose deficit goods. Instead, their task was to convince cash-
strapped customers to pay them instead of the many other creditors pleading
to be paid.
The sort of personal trust managers had been taught to cultivate in
their partners worked to good effect. This strategy was less successful
when dealing with unfamiliar firms. Indeed, often it worked to their
detriment by encouraging managers to make decisions based on their gut
instinct as to the trustworthiness of the firm representatives they met. In the
absence of a preexisting relationship, these representatives often lied. As
managers recognized the futility of relying on outward appearances of
reliability, they sought out more objective indicators, such as bank
statements. But these documents were typically provided by the
prospective customers, illustrating that they remained locked into the
bilateral framework that had served them well in the past. Nothing in their
125 See generally Matthias Klaes & Esther-Mirjam Sent, A Conceptual History of the
Emergence of Bounded Rationality, 37 HIST. OF POL. ECON. 27 (2005). Zucker's twist on
this concept may also be applicable. She writes:
While rationality is bounded because of imperfect information, efficiency is
bounded because payoff to innovativeness is uncertain, and because transactions
require willing exchange partners, based on perceptions of legitimacy, similarity,
and common interests. The end result is bounded efficiency, where a firm is
pressured to perform w/in limits set by the high and low performers in the relevant
comparison group. Zucker, supra note 28, at 67.
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prior experience would lead them to look to third parties for assessments of
trustworthiness. Just the opposite. Thus, the idea of relying on a credit-
rating agency would not have resonated with them.126
E. Inertia
As this suggests, the managers at the case study enterprises often
behaved in a rote manner, replicating the behavior that had served them
well in the past. The lack of stability within the Russian economy in the
late 1990s left little time for reflection. Managers behaved instinctually,
drawing on habits formed during the Soviet period. The role of inertia is
often underappreciated, but cannot be overlooked in explaining behavior
during economic transitions.
The explanatory power of inertia is particularly evident with regard to
MBT and SK, the two case studies that shared a lengthy Soviet history.
MVIBT's use of the "protocols of disagreement" made no logical sense once
central planning ended. MBT had already taken the first step by creating its
own form sales contract in lieu of the form previously mandated by its
industrial ministry. Yet the next step of making the few quick adjustments
to the form that would be needed for each specific transaction eluded them.
Neither the in-house lawyer nor the sales director could give me a reason
for this. It was apparent that the idea of not using the protocols had never
occurred to them. After all, protocols did not cause any harm; they simply
made the transaction more cumbersome. Streamlining the contractual
process fell rather low on the list of priorities for MBT's lawyer and sales
director.
The pull of inertia had created a sort of parallel universe at SK in
which SK continued to behave as if it were supplying the auto, truck, and
aviation assembly plants that had been its key customers in the Soviet era.
Managers at SK and at these former customers colluded to sustain this
fantasy. They spent considerable time working through each others'
proposals for amendments to the contracts. Not surprisingly they (like
MBT) used "protocols of disagreement" to communicate their desired
changes. The only possible economic justification for this behavior was a
hope that production would be revived at these assembly plants. By 1998-
five years into Russia's economic depression-it would be more accurate to
characterize this as a fantasy rather than a hope. But it was easier for the
SK managers to replicate past behavior than to face the difficult truth that
life had changed for good.
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Newman, Dun & Bradstreet: For the Promotion and Protection of Trade, in REPUTATION:
STUDIES IN THE VOLUNTARY ELICITATION OF GOOD CONDUCT 85 (Daniel B. Klein ed., 1997).
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VII. CONCLUSION
While my research confirms the common wisdom that contracts played
a marginal role in Russian business life of the late 1990s, it strongly
suggests that the reasons for this had little to do with the inadequacies of
contract law or fears of being unable to enforce court judgments. For
Russian managers, these were second-order issues. Their main
preoccupation was with figuring out the credit-worthiness of potential
trading partners. They had few institutional tools to help them assess
reputation. There were no credit-rating agencies; firms lacked lengthy track
records. Managers knew that if they mistakenly extended credit to a
scoundrel firm, the firm would have made itself effectively judgment-proof
either by emptying out its bank accounts or by disappearing into thin air.
Even the best legal system can do little to protect against this sort of
"anything goes" business culture. In such a race to the bottom, worrying
about the law was akin to rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.
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